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Fire departments often respond to incidents at crowded events with no prior 
planning or coordination with other agencies. The result can be decreased safety for patrons 
at the events. The purpose of this thesis is to understand causes of injuries at crowded, 
outside venues and what could make these events safer. This thesis asks how fire 
department personnel can plan for the safety and care of large crowds at outside venues. 
The research design includes a review of literature on crowd dynamics and example 
incidents. Using root cause analysis, this thesis analyzes four case studies: 1989 
Hillsborough soccer match, 2011 Reno Air Race, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, 
and 2014 Travis Air Force Base Air Show. The success of the Reno Air Race and 
Boston Marathon rescue personnel in taking care of injured victims can be attributed 
to careful planning by stakeholders before the events took place. This thesis recommends 
that before large, crowded events, stakeholders establish relationships and that all 
stakeholders participate in careful planning and realistic training. This planning and 
training should include interoperability of communications, roles for volunteer staff, and 
ways to prevent and decrease overcrowding. Finally, this thesis recommends strategies 
to educate event patrons on safety.  
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This thesis seeks to determine how fire departments can plan for the safety and care 
of people in large crowds at outside venues. It is important for fire departments to 
understand crowd dynamics and behavior as they attempt to oversee safety for the large, 
dense crowds. The thesis analyzes crowd behavior by examining incidents that happened 
at large crowded events. These events provide insight about crowd reaction to unexpected 
incidents at large outdoor events and resulting safety concerns. However, there is not 
comprehensive data available on these events through impartial government sources. 
Therefore, the thesis also analyzes four case studies: the 1989 Hillsborough soccer match, 
the 2011 Reno Air Race, the 2013 Boston Marathon, and 2014 Travis Air Force Base Air 
Show, all of which include tragic events and have government, open-source material 
available for analysis. The resulting data supports recommendations for fire departments 
on improved safety at future crowded venues.  
Crowds move in both predictable and unpredictable patterns.1 Large outdoor events 
can draw crowds ranging from 1,000 people, up to or easily exceeding 100,000 people, all 
moving around in the crowd independently or as one group, mimicking fluid movement.2 
Routinely, events such as inaugurations, golf tournaments, bicycle races, marathons, 
sporting events, and air shows generate huge groups.  
This thesis uses a systematic approach to conduct research. The first step of the 
research is to understand how crowds move and what determines their movement. This 
thesis also examines strategies for crowd management to prevent injuries and to deliver 
care when there are injuries. The information comes from open sources, including sources 
such as after-action reports, journals, newspaper articles, and reports of boards of inquiry; 
however, sources are limited to historical public events, since practical experimentation of 
actual crowd conditions may not be safely replicated in a research scenario. The next step 
                                                 
1 G. Keith Still, Introduction to Crowd Science (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013). 
2 Dirk Helbing, Anders Johansson, and Habib Zein Al-Abideen, “The Dynamics of Crowd Disasters: 
An Empirical Study,” Physical Review E 75, no. 4 (2007): https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.75.046109.  
xvi
is identification and analysis of common problems that responders encounter in trying to 
deliver aid and care at large events. For the third step, this researcher conducted case study 
analysis to examine crowd behavior and response issues together.  
This research uses root cause analysis in the four case studies to identify causal 
factors leading to deaths and injuries.3 Using Department of Energy guidance on the 
procedure for root cause determination, the first phase in determining root cause is to 
identify the specific problem rather than the unintended occurrence that resulted. The 
second phase is to determine the importance of the incident with regard to injuries that 
happen at the events and what may have caused them. The third phase is to identify the 
cause of the incident by examining the pre-event risk assessment. The last phase is to find 
the cause by starting at the end of the incident and working backward toward the beginning 
of the incident to determine what factors may have caused the incident.4  
The data gleaned from examining the literature and the root cause analysis of the 
case studies reveals some common problems caused by human behavior and interaction 
during emergencies at crowded events. Some of the problems noted are overcrowding, 
incidents caused by human error, and issues with communications. The results of that 
behavior can cause injuries or deaths almost instantaneously, as it did at the Hillsborough 
soccer match on April 15, 1989, when 96 people died and hundreds were injured. The 
cause of the deaths was compressive asphyxia, a condition resulting in the inability to 
breathe.5 However, the reason people died and were injured was due to improper 
actions taken by the police on scene, who mistakenly opened a gate and allowed 
thousands of soccer fans to rush into confined areas that were not meant to hold the 
number of people who surged in.6 
3 U.S. Department of Energy, Root Cause Analysis Guidance Document (DOE-NE-STD-1004-92) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 1992), https://www.standards.doe.gov/standards-
documents/1000/1104-std-1992/@@images/file.  
4 Ibid., 1.  
5 Helbing, Johansson, and Zein Al-Abideen, “The Dynamics of Crowd Disasters,” 5. 
6 Patrick Sawer, “What Happened at Hillsborough in 1989?,” The Telegraph, April 15, 1989, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/happened-hillsborough-1989/.  
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As previously stated, the reactions by the crowd and the police were the result of 
human behavior. Additional findings of this research reveal that people walk at different 
speeds (some slower, some faster), and people moving at different speeds in a dense crowd 
can affect the ability of others to move effectively. Venues that are densely crowded also 
inhibit the ability of people to move freely, which may cause some to fall or trip. The most 
densely populated crowds are unable to stop moving to allow a fallen person to get up or 
be assisted, and this can result in injury or death. People who have fallen in a dense crowd 
become trip hazards for the moving crowd, which then has to change direction to avoid the 
person; however, given crowd size and momentum, it may not always be possible for the 
crowd to avoid a fallen person. Additionally, barriers, like turnstiles or fencing, that are 
improperly placed at venues to direct crowd movement can slow the movement of people, 
causing bottlenecks and potential injury. 
Preventing injury is paramount at crowded events, and this responsibility falls to 
fire departments and other emergency responders. This research found that staging 
emergency personnel and their equipment at strategic locations during events can decrease 
the response time for responders to reach patients and begin giving care. In turn, this 
increases the viability of severely injured patients, as demonstrated in the Boston Marathon 
and Reno Air Race case studies.  
This research also found that communications is one of the most important factors 
in these events. Furthermore, communications were specifically a problem at Hillsborough 
soccer match, but a tremendous help at both Boston Marathon and Travis Air Show, where 
responders had interoperable radios and a public address system, respectively. The positive 
responses received from after-action reports indicate that planning and training prior to an 
event produces a cohesive group of emergency responders who work well together. 
Recommendations for future outside venues include the development of a standard 
planning program involving all fire department and emergency services, including all 
related public service agencies that will be associated with an event, and the planning 
should be specifically tailored proposed location of the event. The program should not only 
provide a plan for emergency response, but it should also include tabletop exercises and 
live drills, such as used in the Reno Air Race and Boston Marathon before the events, to 
 xviii
develop and deliver the skills of stakeholders and staff that are needed to achieve public 
safety and care.  
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I. THE FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSPECTIVE: 
PROVIDING CROWD SAFETY DURING DYNAMIC EVENTS 
Crowds move in both predictable and unpredictable patterns.1 Large outdoor events 
can draw crowds ranging from a 1,000 people up to or easily exceeding 100,000 people, 
all moving around in the crowd independently or as one group, mimicking fluid 
movement.2 Routinely, events such as inaugurations, golf tournaments, bicycle races, 
marathons, sporting events, and air shows generate huge groups. Researchers like Still, 
Helbing, Fahy, Proulx, and Aiman have studied similar venues analyzing data to form a 
possible solution for preventing injury from sudden movement of people in densely 
populated events.  
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
The movement, size, density, and complexity of crowds at large, outdoor events 
may make it difficult to plan for the safety of patrons, including their ability to safely 
egress.3 People’s dynamic movement may be triggered by looking for food, attractions, or 
bathrooms.4 People who formed groups within crowds and are moving in a particular 
direction may encounter other groups that have formed in the crowd and are moving in a 
different direction. When this happens, each group will try to take a path of least 
resistance.5 This can cause the other groups in the crowd to change their direction of travel 
as well. The effect is rather like swirling eddies in turbulent water. When crowd size and 
density increase, it can compound these turbulent effects because the larger and denser a 
crowd is, the more difficult it is for individuals to move independently within the crowd.6 
Obstacles that prohibit smooth travel of crowds add complications to the movement and 
                                                 
1 G. Keith Still, Introduction to Crowd Science (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).  
2 Dirk Helbing, Anders Johansson, and Habib Zein Al-Abideen, “The Dynamics of Crowd Disasters: 
An Empirical Study,” Physical Review E 75, no. 4 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.75.046109.  
3 G. Keith Still, Introduction to Crowd Science (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).  
4 Ibid., 38.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
 2
direction of individuals or groups in those crowds. These obstacles can include strollers, 
wheelchairs, and people who travel at different speeds.7 An emergency affecting the crowd 
can result in injuries, resulting in ineffective movement to exits and safety. Fire 
departments are tasked with assisting the injured and attempt to provide crowds with safe 
passage to exits.  
Emergencies at outdoor venues arise from unexpected events affecting crowd’s safe 
movement and departure. The incidents can result in injury anywhere from a few people to 
several hundred people or more. When members of a crowd are injured, it can cause others 
in the crowds to move quickly to try and get to safety; this more difficult in denser, larger 
crowds. An example of a high-risk, low-frequency event may be one due to weather, an 
earthquake, terrorist activity, or another emergency. An emergency situation with a crowd 
can inhibit people’s safe passage to an exit, causing the group to move in unpredictable 
patterns and keeping the fire department from efficiently assisting. The result may be an 
increase in injuries, which overwhelms available resources. The inevitability of incidents 
involving injuries is an obvious concern at crowded events.8  
A better understanding of what causes crowd movement may help firefighters 
assigned with public safety at events to prevent injury. It is essential to understand what 
causes crowd movement to avert injury entirely. Designing safety features and 
implementing them prior to an event is vitally important for prevention of injury as well.9 
G. Keith Still has been studying crowd dynamics for more than 25 years to make people 
safe at large venues and attributes prevention and preparedness to provide the answer.10 
One method for understanding crowd movement and planning for safe exiting is through 
the use of computer modeling software to determine crowd movement and size, as well as 
the direction of its flow in an emergency. Ed Galea, Director of Fire Safety Engineering 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 121.  
8 G. Keith Still, “Crowd Dynamics: Thesis” (PhD. Diss., University of Warwick, 2000), 
http://www.gkstill.com/Support/Links/Documents/2000_still.pdf, 26.  
9 Still, Introduction to Crowd Science. 
10 Still, “Crowd Disasters; Thesis,” 39.  
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Group at the University of Greenwich developed Exodus software.11 The software can 
produce effective results to allowing a smoother transition of people through an exit 
through large events, thereby decreasing injury and death in an emergency.12 It is designed 
to work with existing structures and to help develop new buildings, aircraft, and venue 
safety. The Exodus computer modeling program can simulate buildings, outdoor venues, 
aircraft and is scalable to match any number of prospective patrons. It can mimic decisions 
by individuals and simulate the responses and results during an emergency.13 Different 
exits and conditions may also be added to the program to anticipate the paths that people 
will follow to leave an area safely.14  
Prevention is critical to sustaining the safety of individuals.15 It is therefore much 
easier to teach the public how to prevent injury with education about safety and exiting at 
large venues than how to recover from an injury sustained. It is also essential to determine 
effective procedures and training for operations during an emergency. When firefighters 
operate professionally and competently during an emergency incident, it decreases the 
probability of additional injuries to people and increases the possibility of survival for the 
injured.16 This thesis explores elements of crowd movement and crowd dynamics during 
emergencies. The information obtained in this research will help determine how fire 
departments can better understand and implement efforts to prevent injury, provide care, 
and facilitate egress in emergencies. The complexity of large events, including the 
                                                 
11 Ed Galea, “Scientists Launch World’s Most Advanced Crowd Simulation and Evacuation 
Software,” Hemming Fire, January 10, 2012, http://hemmingfire.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1416/ 
Scientists_launch_world_92s_most_advanced_crowd_simulation_and_evacuation_software_.html.  
12 Andrew Lynch, “World’s Most Advanced Crowd Simulation and Evacuation Software,” Fire 
Magazine, January 10, 2012, https://www.fire-magazine.com/worlds_most_advanced_crowd_ 
simulation_and_evacuation_software_12799.aspx.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Joseph Manuse, “Gates Fire District,” Firehouse Magazine, April 1, 2016, 
http://www.firehouse.com/article/12188146/fire-prevention-take-life-safety-messages; National Fire 
Protection Association, “NFPA 101,” accessed February 26, 2017, http://www.nfpa.org/Assets/ 
files/AboutTheCodes/101/BLDSAF-HEA_FDSupItemAgenda_08-12.pdf.  
16 Mark Wallace, “Strategic Planning for Training and Professional Development,” Fire Engineering 
162, no. 8 (2009), http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-162/issue-8/features/strategic-
planning-for-training-and-professional-development.html.  
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complexity of crowd dynamics and behavior, have hampered the ability of fire departments 
to formulate specific policies for their involvement in these types of events. The findings 
of this thesis will help to guide fire departments in the development of generalized policies 
and procedures for large events.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to determine how fire departments can plan for the safety and care 
of people in large crowds at outside venues.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Large outdoor venues create fast, unpredictable movements of people that result in 
dynamic crowd responses. A crowd’s density determines the ability for individuals in the 
crowd to move quickly (or not) in the direction they want to go. An emergency can amplify 
crowd response and increase the number of individuals injured, resulting in an increased 
response time for first responders to administer care. Research thus has provided limited 
information on the subject of crowd dynamics and safety from a fire department’s 
perspective is limited. Therefore, sources from law enforcement research and studies of 
indoor venues related to exits in buildings and stadiums have been included. 
1. Crowd Behavior  
The field of crowd dynamics is not new and has been an area of concentrated study 
since 1995.17 For example, G. Keith Still has worked for many years researching crowd 
movement and is considered a subject matter expert in the United Kingdom.18 His research 
is related to all types of indoor and outdoor events and focuses on preventing injury. Still’s 
research indicates that problems associated with crowds and their safety are a matter of 
misuse of space due to “design and management.”19 Additionally, his research also 
                                                 
17 Dirk Helbing, Anders Johansson, and Habib Zein Al-Abideen, “The Dynamics of Crowd Disasters: 
An Empirical Study,” Physical Review E 75, no. 4 (2007): https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.75.046109. 
18 Keith Still, “Prof. Still—Biography,” last updated October 4, 2007, 
http://www.gkstill.com/CV/index.html.  
19 Still, “Crowd Disasters.”  
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examines historical events resulting in injury and crowd management. This real-world 
information is of vital importance since it is not based on laboratory research alone. Still 
found that the key to developing a safe environment for people is through continued 
analysis of events and use of software programs as methods to prevent to crowd injuries.20 
Still also incorporates the use of mathematics and crowd density calculations to determine 
the maximum number of people who can safely attend an event.21 He states that crowds 
having five people or fewer per square meter is safer and allows free movement of people, 
whereas crowds of six or more people per square meter present a potential disaster through 
“shockwaves.”22 Shockwaves, or crowd rush, which can cause injury or death, are created 
when people suddenly move unpredictably in a dense crowd.  
In contrast to Still’s approach to analyzing crowd dynamics, some scholars 
primarily use risk analysis to develop techniques for safety. One such expert is David Vose, 
who advocates eliminating the probability of an incident to decrease the occurrence of 
injury at events.23 Vose has worked as a risk analysis consultant since 1988 and has written 
several books on the subject of risk. He differs from others in his process of analysis as he 
allows the problem to orchestrate the analysis, rather than developing a theory and then 
trying to prove it.24 To determine risk for an outside venue with a large crowd, Vose looks 
at what he calls the “value of information” and uses the results to drive the possibility of 
risk by determining a cost.25 Vose looks at the amount of money received at a venue, which 
produces a gross income and net profit. The income would be compared to the value or 
cost of an incident, thereby decreasing the net profit.26 Although Vose’s research is not 
specifically directed at large outside events, which is the focus of this thesis, he does 
                                                 
20 Still, “Crowd Dynamics: Thesis.”   
21 Ibid., iii.  
22 G. Keith Still, “Introduction to Crowd Science,” GKStill, last modified August 20, 2016, 
http://www.gkstill.com/Support/index.html.  
23 David Vose, Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 85.  
24 Vose recognized the works of Morgan and Henrion’s research and related to his own. Vose, Risk 
Analysis.  
25 Vose, Risk Analysis.  
26 Ibid., 473.  
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provide information to educate individuals who assess risks of any type. For example, Vose 
tries to teach managers that proper risk management decreases the probability of an 
incident, thereby decreasing the number of people and equipment needed to achieve a goal 
safely and efficiently.27 His strategy can be applied as easily to safe crowd management as 
to safety for cruise ships.  
Karamouzas et al. use quantitative analysis and newly developed “physics-based 
animation software” to provide dependable and reliable simulations of crowd behavior 
while leaving a venue.28 They note the different patterns of movement that crowds take 
while exiting through hallways, making lanes of traffic or a “zipper pattern,” when 
converging from different directions.29 Their findings, when applied to an emergency 
evacuation, are vitally important to fire, law, and emergency medical services (EMS) since 
crowds exhibit a different type of behavior during egress. Karamouzas et al. indicate the 
problems associated with a crowd exiting a venue during an emergency create stalls in the 
crowd, which develop congestion, and this in turn slows the progress of evacuation while 
increasing the likelihood of injury.30  
Daichi Yanagisawa et al., graduate students at the University of Tokyo, have 
advocated for placing obstacles in predetermined locations near exits. Their ideas directly 
oppose conventional theory from other researchers like Karamouzas and his colleagues, 
who believe that obstacles slow exiting and create congestion.31 No one had attempted this 
kind of approach previously. Ironically, the study by Yanagisawa et al. was inspired by 
empirical observations of obstacles slowing traffic.32 They determined that putting barriers 
directly in front of exits attained few advantages; however, moving barriers slightly off 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 17.  
28 Ioannis Karamouzas et al., “Implicit Crowds: Optimization Integrator for Robust Crowd 
Simulation,” ACM Transactions on Graphics 36, no. 4 (2017): Article 136, 
https://people.cs.clemson.edu/~ioannis/implicit-crowds/files/implicit_crowds.pdf.  
29 Ibid., 7.1.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Daichi Yanagisawa et al., “Introduction of Frictional and Turning Function for Pedestrian Outflow 
with an Obstacle,” Physical Review E 80, no. 3 (2009), https://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.0224.pdf.  
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center of the exit and at a prescribed distance gained a distinct advantage to speed exiting.33 
Yanagisawa et al. claimed the obstacles cause individuals to slow down and decide their 
path for exiting, thereby slowing their pace and preventing the possibility of knocking 
people down or injuring them as the crowd moves toward an exit in an emergency.34 An 
important part of this study is the recognition that people decide the direction in which they 
move and that people take the time to consider options. Therefore, Yanagisawa et al. claim 
that people move more slowly while exiting when they encounter a barrier, giving them 
time to think about the direction to exit, resulting in faster exit times.35  
Andreas Schadschneider, a professor at the University of Cologne’s theoretical 
physics department, and his colleagues, Debashish Chowdhury and Katsuhiro Nishinari, 
oppose the approach of Yanagisawa et al.36 In an interview by John Matson, a journalist 
for Scientific American Magazine, Schadschneider asserted that an obstacle-type egress 
would induce people to seek other exits and possibly create more problems and injuries.37 
He cited an example of an evacuation experiment of an A-380 Airbus aircraft in 2006 in 
which people sustained multiple injuries and one person had broken bones.38 
Schadschneider, Chowdhury, and Nishinari believe that an experiment cannot predict 
individual human behavior during an emergency, claiming an individual’s ability to make 
decisions decreases during an emergency.39 Their research supports the idea that people 
follow each other just as they do on a trail, one behind the other. Moreover, the time to exit 
safely decreases with each person following an unknown leader on the vague path.40  
                                                 
33 Ibid., 1.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid., iv.  
36 Andreas Schadschneider, Debashish Chowdhury, and Katsuhiro Nishinari, Stochastic Transport in 
Complex Systems: From Molecules to Vehicles (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2010).  
37 John Matson, “Strategically Placed Obstacle Near an Exit Can Speed Evacuations,” Scientific 
American, August 28, 2009, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/obstacle-exit-pedestrian/.  
38 Associated Press, “33 Injured in Safety Test for Airbus Super-Jumbo,” The Guardian, March 27, 
2006, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/mar/28/theairlineindustry.internationalnews.  
39 Schadschneider, Chowdhury, and Nishinari, Stochastic Transport.  
40 Ibid.  
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Schadschneider and his colleagues are not without opposition. For example, a 
report by Rita F. Fahy, Guylene Proulx, and Lata Aiman provide an alternative theory for 
people’s behavior in emergencies.41 Their work claims that the human response is not 
necessarily characterized as panic in an emergency but as that of calculated decision 
making.42 Unfortunately, the human response is most often to exit in masse from the point 
of entry, as shown during the Stardust Nightclub fire in 1981.43 Rather than recognizing 
there were other available exits, during the fire club patrons chose to go to the front doors 
through which they had initially entered the building. Some fell in a crowd crush and piled 
up, preventing others from escape. The results were similarly devastating during the Station 
Night Club fire in 2003, which killed 100 people and injured more than 200.44 As with the 
Stardust incident, although many other exits went unused, people tried to exit through the 
same doors they entered, creating a human blockade as they fell.45 Considering 
Schadschneider, Debashish, and Nishinari’s theory, choosing to follow a line of people out 
of a building may not be the wisest decision.46 
The research of Helbing and Johannsson aligns with that of Still in that they 
consider many possibilities for crowd behavior rather than standing on a single method like 
physics or animation.47 Helbing and Johannsson have taken the time to analyze how and 
why people react the way they do to given situations. He then analyzes human behavior, 
such as attempting to pass known obstacles at a venue or in buildings, with different 
                                                 
41 Rita Fahy, Guylene Proulx, and Lata Aiman, “‘Panic’ and Human Behaviour in Fire,” in 
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire (Cambridge, UK: Robinson 
College, 2009), http://tkolb.net/FireReports/PanicInFire09.pdf, 387–398.   
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 “The Station Nightclub Fire,” National Fire Protection Association, accessed February 25, 2017, 
http://www.nfpa.org/public-education/by-topic/property-type-and-vehicles/nightclubs-assembly-
occupancies/the-station-nightclub-fire.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Schadschneider, Chowdhury, and Nishinari, Stochastic Transport.  
47 Dirk Helbing and Anders Johansson, Pedestrian Crowd and Evacuation Dynamics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University, 2013), http://www.ethlife.ethz.ch/archive_articles/100727_Massenpanik_Helbing_sch/ 
Pedestrian_Crowd_and_Evacuation_Dynamics_Helbing.pdf.  
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configurations to determine outcomes.48 This information can be applied to outdoor events 
where buildings, cars, or other barriers may be a factor in crowd movement. Helbing and 
Johansson consider human reasoning in developing his theories just as Schadschneider, 
Chowdhury, and Nishinari believe that individual decisions play a major role in the human 
response and can lead to injury at crowded event.49 Helbing and Johannsson also explain 
that people have different gaits, which affect their ability to exit a venue. One must also 
consider age, disability, and the use of prostheses in determining a person’s mobility and 
self-transport. When personal mobility becomes disrupted, a person’s direction of choice 
can no longer be predetermined, which can create chaos and change the outcome of one’s 
intended path of travel.50 Exiting problems were put to the test in a 1990 scenario to help 
make egress from an aircraft safer after an aircraft incident a few years prior.51  
Britain’s Civil Aviation Authority asked Helen Muir, psychologist and researcher, 
and her colleague, Clair Marrison, to develop safe aircraft-exiting procedures after the 
Boeing Flight 28 disaster in Manchester, England in the 1980s.52 The pilots believed their 
aircraft had punctured a tire during take-off. In reality, an engine failure had occurred and 
started a fire in the aft portion of the plane’s cabin.53 The pilots stopped the aircraft before 
taking off as the fire spread in the cabin, killing 55 people, mostly by smoke inhalation.54 
Passengers were unable to find exits in the smoke-filled cabin, and some exit doors were 
jammed, preventing passengers opening them.55 Muir and Marrison determined that it was 
both features of the plane and airline procedures that killed the passengers.56 Their work is 
                                                 
48 Helbing and Johansson, Pedestrian Crowd.  
49 Matson, “Strategically Placed Obstacle.”  
50 Helbing and Johansson, Pedestrian Crowd.   
51 Helen Muir and Claire Marrison, “Human Factors in Cabin Safety,” Cabin Crew Safety 25, no. 2 
(1990): 1–6, https://flightsafety.org/ccs/ccs_mar-apr90.pdf.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Tom Mullen, “A Defining Disaster for Air Travel,” BBC News, August 17, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-33304675.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Muir and Marrison, “Human Factors.”  
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particularly relevant to the focus of this thesis, which is how to move a group of individuals, 
without harm, in an emergency through a safe exit at a large event.  
Researchers have used models and participants to develop a conclusive answer to 
problems associated with trying to move many people during an emergency. However, the 
admittedly tricky aspect of such studies, as pinpointed by Schadschneider, Chowdhury, 
and Nishinari, have been replicating actual emergency conditions in an experimental 
environment.57 To address this problem, Muir and Marrison introduced a simple concept: 
they paid individuals to exit the plane as quickly as possible and rewarded those who exited 
first.58 Interior footage of the experiment in the aircraft revealed the chaotic and aggressive 
movements of participants, the same behavior as passengers on Flight 28. Muir and 
Marrison realized several things that could be changed to help facilitate the safe exit of 
passengers in emergencies. First, it was necessary to have illuminated pathways to see a 
trail to exit locations in smoke-filled cabins. Next, the width of bulkhead openings―the 
passageway itself―could be increased to provide swifter exiting. More importantly for 
Muir and Marrison was the need to take decision making away from people by training 
flight crews to aggressively assist passengers while exiting a plane during an emergency.59 
Essentially, Muir and Marrison recommended that crew members be strategically placed 
in the cabin and physically help passengers to exit.60 Their method contrasts with those of 
Helbing, Johansson, and Al-Abideen, Yanagisawa et al., and Schadschneider, Debashish, 
and Nishinari, whose findings suggest individual decision making can help with safe 
egress.  
It is important to note that the data obtained and analyzed by the researchers 
discussed above and used in this thesis is the result of research and development. Their 
work presents innovative ideas to create a safe environment for the public at venues. The 
researchers discussed in this literature review have not disregarded necessary fire 
ordinances and safety. In their work, these researchers were following the ordinances 
                                                 
57 Matson, “Strategically Placed Obstacle.”  
58 Muir and Marrison, “Human Factors.”  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.   
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required by fire marshals, who require adherence to the National Fire Protection 
Association’s (NFPA) Life Safety Code 101 in the United States.61 European countries 
currently use international building codes developed from U.S. codes and ordinances to 
comply with life safety as well.62 The codes define and describe how fire departments must 
protect assemblies of individuals, both indoors and out.63 The researchers highlighted in 
this thesis use this information in conjunction with their theories to develop new and better 
ways to facilitate egress from crowded venues and to provide safety for citizens. 
2. Literature Review Conclusion 
This literature review shows the many moving parts related to crowd dynamics and 
public safety at events. Also, the review shows how most authors in the review believe that 
crowd decisions are major contributors for public safety. There are many researchers 
working to develop answers to the problems associated with large crowd exiting at outside 
venues. Still, Helbing, Anders, and Zein pose similar opinions regarding the dangers of 
densely populated crowds. Some researchers advocate the use of software to determine 
safety at venues while others believe that placing obstacles at exits will enhance the ability 
of a person to make decisions in an emergency. All the researchers discussed in the 
literature review are dedicated to determining the safest means for people to consistently 
exit venues, buildings, and structures without harm. In California, fire departments are 
responsible for using the information established by experience and research to provide 
safety for the public at public venues and in the areas they serve. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis asks how emergency personnel can plan for the safety and care of 
dynamic crowds during outdoor events. Incidents at crowded venues resulting in injury can 
                                                 
61 National Fire Protection Association, “NFPA 101.”  
62 George H. Potter, “International Fire Safety Legislation: An Overview,” Fire Engineering, February 
14, 2008, http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/2008/02/international-fire-safety-legislation-an-
overview.html.  
63 Fire and Life Safety Planning and Management Guide for Public Assembly Events, University of 
Maryland, accessed April 29, 2017, 
https://www.essr.umd.edu/sites/essr.umd.edu/files/files/documents/pubguide.pdf.  
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be the result of emergencies and overcrowding. The literature indicates that crowds 
typically respond to emergencies by looking for safe exits, not by running in a state of 
panic.64 It is essential for fire department to identify the factors contributing to deaths and 
injuries at crowded events, so that fire departments may consider these factors for their 
operations and response. 
The first step of the research is to understand how crowds move and what 
determines their movement. This thesis also examines strategies for crowd management to 
prevent injuries and deliver care. The information comes from open sources, including 
sources such as after action reports, journals, newspaper articles, and reports of boards of 
inquiry; however, sources are limited to historical public events since practical 
experimentation of actual crowd conditions may not be safely replicated in a research 
scenario. The next step is identification and analysis of common problems responders 
encounter in trying to deliver aid and care at large events. 
For the third step, this researcher conducted case study analysis to examine crowd 
behavior and response issues together. The four case studies include the 1989 Hillsborough 
soccer match, the 2011 Reno Air Race, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, and the 2014 
Travis Air Force Base (AFB) air show,  all of which include tragic events and have 
government, open source material available for analysis. This research uses root cause 
analysis in the case studies to identify causal factors leading to deaths and injuries.65 Using 
Department of Energy guidance on the procedure for root cause determination, the first 
phase in determining root cause is to identify the specific problem and not the unintended 
occurrence that resulted. The second phase is to determine the importance of the incident 
with regard to injuries that happen at the events and what may have caused them. The third 
phase is to identify the cause of the incident by examining the pre-event risk assessment. 
                                                 
64 Christopher Cocking and John Drury, “The Mass Psychology of Disasters and Emergency 
Evacuations: A Research Report and Implications for the Fire and Rescue Service,” Fire Safety, 
Technology and Management, 10 (2008): 13–19.  
65 U.S. Department of Energy, Root Cause Analysis Guidance Document (DOE-NE-STD-1004-92) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 1992), https://www.standards.doe.gov/standards-
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The last phase is to find the cause by starting at the end of the incident and working 
backward toward the beginning to determine what factors may have caused the incident.66  
With the objective of identifying preventive measures for future incidents, this 
thesis uses the root cause analysis developed from case studies to craft recommendations 
for planning events at outside venues. However, this research has some limitations since 
there is little information specific to fire departments at crowded venues. Additionally, the 
study does not include crowd control issues that are mitigated by law enforcement 
response. However, because law enforcement is a component of a unified command, this 
thesis addresses operability. This project is limited also by the amount of open source 
information available related to historical incidents. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II discusses several incidents and the issues surrounding the loss of life and 
injury. Chapter III looks at safe egress and fire department involvement by methods of 
response at large venues. Chapter IV examines four case studies involving patrons at 
outside venues who sustained severe injuries. Chapter V combines the data collected and 
provides a guide that can be used to organize future events to decrease the possibility of 
injury. Finally, Chapter VI concludes with a synopsis of the analysis and collected data by 
developing information from researchers discussed in the literature review and their 
findings.  
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II. CROWD BEHAVIOR 
People form groups, change direction, and become a vulnerable population at 
concerts, sporting events, and religious gatherings. The probability of death and injury at 
such events increases with the size of the crowd and frequency with which they gather. 
This chapter focuses on the safety and care for groups of people forming at outside venues 
during races, golf tournaments, air shows, holidays, sporting events, and other similar 
gatherings. This chapter presents example descriptions of recent events and emergency 
response. The word behavior is generally used to describe how people move and react at 
large outdoor events.  
A. CROWD DYNAMICS 
Crowd dynamics is the study of people forming into groups and the ways they move 
safely.67 The different makeup of crowds adds to the difficulty of their movement.68 People 
are not all the same and do not move with the same gait, and this affects their ability to 
move through a crowd. Some of the contributing factors can be height, weight, age, 
wheelchairs, and strollers; crowd movement can also be affected by those who move 
against the flow of traffic to make purchases, find friends, or look for a better vantage point. 
As previously discussed, the density of a crowd is one determinant in how safely 
crowds move. One person per square meter is preferred at venues, according to Helbing, 
Johansson, and Al-Abideen.69 Proper spacing allows people to change direction quickly 
and move at their individual paces. As the number of individuals per square meter 
increases, their ability to move freely decreases, multiplying their possibility of risk of an 
incident. Once the density reaches six people per square meter, the risk of an incident 
reaches a critical point. At that point, the density is so high that if one person falls or 
stumbles, an injury will likely occur.70 The study of crowd density is complicated and relies 
                                                 
67 Still, “Crowd Dynamics: Thesis,” 5.  
68 Ibid., 24.  
69 Helbing, Johansson, and Al-Abideen, “The Dynamics of Crowd Disasters.”  
70 Ibid.  
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on many factors, including the demographics of the crowd. Therefore, people who conduct 
research on crowd movement must consider all factors to be able to predict movement and 
responses.  
Physicists conducted research on crowd movement in 1995 using particle models 
consisting of small circular beads to mimic the movement of people.71 The models revealed 
an interesting phenomenon, showing how people move like fluid and are trapped or slowed 
by narrowed passages, obstacles, direction change, or stopping. Speed and direction change 
in dense crowds can be lethal. The studies have found inadvertent slowing or stopping 
causes a rebound effect that immediately turns into a wave-type response.72 Energy 
increases as pressure from moving bodies are exerted on members of the crowd, causing 
injury and death.73 As each person moves forward, the people near him or her do the same, 
each forward movement becoming successively closer and closer. The result is a densely 
packed crowd that is potentially deadly.74 Crowd movement happens so quickly that it 
resembles ripples on a pond from a cast stone. John Fruin cites examples of crowds in 
which people have experienced injury and death from sudden shifts or violent actions with 
densities of only seven people per square meter.75 Sudden movements may lift people into 
the air as high as 10 feet, removing their shoes and clothes, and leaving them on the ground 
unable to move due to crowd movement or their own anxiety.76 As the crowd moves over 
the victims, they are unable to breathe due to compressive asphyxia (being crushed), which 
can result in injury or death.77 
                                                 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.    
73 Wenjian Yu and Anders Johansson, “Modeling Crowd Turbulence by Many-Particle Simulations,” 
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B. CROWDS: HIGH RISK, LOW FREQUENCY 
The following examples of incidents illustrate the problems associated with crowd 
density at several types of venues and are arranged chronologically. At crowded events, 
fire departments are responsible for injury prevention and mitigation. Therefore, knowing 
the type of incidents that have occurred may provide firefighters with needed information 
for prevention of incidents at future events. Additionally, investigation and after action 
reports provide data that must be analyzed to determine if the information obtained is 
applicable and useful for prevention or code changes. 
Although large outside venues are common, they occur less frequently than daily 
human traffic in urban, suburban, and rural areas, which have little threat of crowd surge. 
However, large congregations of individuals have led problems. Dense crowds are found 
at venues all over the world, and in crowds, social economic status is irrelevant. 
Historically, the number of deaths continues to rise from the same type of tragedy 
regardless of information published on tragedies at related events. For example, there was 
a tragic loss of life on the opening day of the newly constructed Brooklyn Bridge. The last 
child of the Roebling family, Emily, supervised the completion of the bridge in 1883. She 
was the first person to walk across the bridge alone during the opening ceremony. After 
she crossed the bridge, 1,600 people followed to observe the engineering marvel that had 
taken 15 years to complete. As the crowd walked across the bridge, people stopped to sight 
see the river and New York. The crowd compressed as it stopped, and people were unable 
to move forward. Additionally, the densely packed crowd reacted when people mistakenly 
yelled out that the bridge was collapsing. Their rush to gain safety caused people to be 
crushed; 12 people were killed, and hundreds of others were injured78 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Illustrations of the Brooklyn Bridge Incident79  
More than a century after the Brooklyn Bridge incident, crowd accidents continue 
to happen and not just in the United States. On July 3, 1990, a tragedy occurred in a large 
crowd in Mina, Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage to Mecca.80 Thousands sought safe 
refuge from the 112-degree heat in an air conditioned tunnel. As many as 1,400 people 
were killed in what was described as a stampede in the tunnel leading to Mecca.81 Some 
of the witnesses indicated that when people entered the tunnel, the crowd stopped moving 
for an unknown reason, and people succumbed to unconsciousness from asphyxiation. The 
capacity of the tunnel structure was 1,000 people; however, according to witnesses, the 
crown in the tunnel grew to more than 5,000 people during the incident82  
                                                 
79 Sources: “The Desperate Struggle for Life,” drawing by staff artist at Frank Leslie’s Illustrated 
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Crowd related tragedies during the Hajj resulting in death and injuries are frequent 
due to crowd crush. Almost 10,000 pilgrims have been killed at the Hajj since 1985.83 In 
an incident in October 19, 2015, more than 2,000 died in what has been described as a 
stampede in Mina near a ritual stoning bridge.84 Although this tragic event was not sparked 
by excessive heat as it was during the pilgrimage in 1990, it had similar devastating 
consequences. As with the 1990 incident, this incident was the result of too many people 
packed densely in a relatively small space.85  
The incident at Mina, like other similar venues, caused injury and death due to the 
high number of individuals per square meter as people tried to move.86 The incident is a 
prime example of an overly dense group, which because of its high density, prevented free 
movement of people.87 At the event, many people complained about the narrow pathways 
restricting the flow of traffic. As the pilgrims tried to move to the stoning bridge, several 
stumbled and were unable to get up due to the massive number of individuals on top of and 
around them; the crowd was too dense. Furthermore, railings bent from the weight of the 
crowd and were pushed on top of people already on the ground, preventing them from 
gaining safety.88 Helbing, Johansson, and Al-Abideen state that as many as 10 people per 
meter are not unusual at the Hajj, supporting the claims of research that over density of 
crowds at events like the Hajj is dangerous.89 
Famous musicians draw also huge crowds. The grunge rock band Pearl Jam was 
one of the many performing at the four-day Roskilde Festival in Denmark in July 2000. 
The festival was started in 1971 to emulate Woodstock.90 At the festival that year, there 
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were seven stages arranged to provide continuous entertainment for the 100,000 fans in 
attendance. Fans pushed to get a closer view at the stage they were at as entertainment 
started.91 Pearl Jam band members recognized the impending tragedy, and using the public 
address system, they began instructing the fans to move back three steps. Witnesses 
complained that patrons were continually pushing their way toward the stages, preventing 
people in front from moving. As people stumbled and fell, others fell on top of them 
creating a human pile; nine were killed many others were injured. Pearl Jam members 
walked off the stage when they learned of the severity of injuries that happened in front of 
them. When the band left the stage, fans moved back and exposed those who were killed 
in the crowd rush.92  
Other festivals have drawn even larger crowds than were at Roskilde. The Love 
Parade was a one-day festival, primarily celebrating music. It started out in Berlin in 1989 
and later moved to Duisburg, Germany.93 The festival has continually grown in popularity 
each year. More and more people flocked to the listen to music at the events, until 2010 
when an estimated 500,000–1,000,000 people arrived.94 The crowd was so large that 1,500 
police at the event quickly reported they were unable to control the crowd.95 Simple math 
puts the ratio of festival patrons to police officers at 666 to 1. An incident occurred in an 
underpass that exceeded its capacity (see Figures 2 and 3). People stopped moving as others 
were trying to move toward the underpass. A crowd crush occurred as the density of people 
increased and were unable to move.  
That year at the Love Parade, more than 300 people were injured, and 19 died of 
traumatic asphyxia.96 The mayor of Duisburg quickly declared a state of emergency in the 
city, asking for help from rescue workers. There were so many people distributed over a 
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large area that the festival continued, and people were unaware of police and ambulance 
sirens as rescue workers arrived to tend to the injured at the scene of the accident.97  
 
Figure 2.  Tunnel Where the Crowd Crush Took Place98 
                                                 
97 Ibid.  
98 Source: “The Love Parade Music Festival from a Gathering of Just 150 to More Than 1 Million 




Figure 3.  Love Parade Crowd Crush99 
The resultant catastrophic event is similarly described by Helbing, Johansson, and 
Al-Abideen, who see a crowd much like moving water. Once the density reaches six 
persons per meter, it is impossible for the number of people entering an area to match the 
number of people leaving the same area, and this creates an incident.100 Regardless of 
crowd density, people never stop moving, which also increases their chance of injury 
significantly as the events above illustrate.101  
C. CROWD RESPONSES TO NATURAL EVENTS: WEATHER, 
ACCIDENTS, AND EARTHQUAKES 
Sudden incidents evolving from the unexpected inclement weather, accidents, and 
earthquakes can be just as lethal and are often more dangerous than incidents created by 
humans. People often disregard warnings for their safety to pursue personal interests and 
entertainment, which can result in their death and injury. This chapter describes naturally 
                                                 
99 Source: Uwe Weber, “World Press Photo of the Year 2010,” Zeitraster, accessed October 15, 2017, 
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occurring phenomena and accidents illustrating public response to several events, some 
deadly. One would anticipate that once the people become aware of a threat, an expected 
appropriate response would be for them to seek safety. However, people do not always 
respond as expected.  
1. Weather 
The high risk of natural phenomena and accidents create deadly problems for 
unsuspecting crowds and participants at outside venues. Public safety and organizers who 
are in charge of an outdoor venue have a responsibility to continually watch weather 
forecasts and ensure the safety of their equipment, thus preventing the possibility of injury 
to patrons. Part of the responsibility is to remove, disassemble, or close equipment that may 
pose a hazard during inclement weather.   
While heat is an issue for people who are not prepared, cold weather is equally as 
dangerous. The Spartan race is an annual event in the Sacramento area and is also held at 
many locations across the United States.102 It is one of the most arduous and grueling 
obstacle course races available for amateur and professional athletes. The 13-mile course 
takes runners through 35 spectacular obstacles in different terrain and elevations to 
challenge their endurance and strength.103 The Sacramento 2012 race was held in 
November, and over 4,000 athletes had to contend with low temperatures. Midway through 
the race, one of the obstacles runners encountered was a pool of ice water. The participants 
were required to swim underwater for a specified distance before continuing the race. Rain, 
wind, and mud compounded the problems associated with the cold-water swim. As a result 
of the swim, 30 participants had to be treated for hypothermia, and they were transported 
to the hospital.104  
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Though it was rain instead of temperature this time, the weather was responsible 
for a crowd rush resulting in injuries and fatalities at a concert in Minsk, Belarus in 1999. 
A sudden cloudburst and hail prompted more than 1,000 concertgoers to seek shelter under 
an overpass.105 The rush of the crowd caused people to move so quickly and uncontrollably 
that a 19-year-old fan named Vitaly Milentyev said he was an unable to walk to safety.106 
Just as Fruin’s research has indicated, this person was physically moved along by the 
crowd.107 Milentyev said he was propelled by the crowd as it moved under the structure 
and could do nothing. He attempted to save a young woman from being crushed by the 
crowd but was unsuccessful.108 The result of the crowd’s sudden movement caused 54 
deaths, including the death of two police officers who were trying to control the fans. There 
were also 150 injuries, 37 of which were critical. 109  
2. Accidents  
Weather is certainly an issue and creates deadly consequences as indicated 
previously. However, dangerous consequences can happen for most any reason at crowded 
events. Turin, Italy was a recent location where members of a large crowd fell victim to a 
catastrophic accident. In June 2017, thousands arrived to watch a soccer match between 
Italy’s Juventus and Spain’s Real Madrid.110 The match was held in Cardiff, Wales; 
however, people wanted to see the game locally. To accommodate, city officials the in 
Turin provided a giant TV screen in Piazza San Carlo for people to watch the match111 (see 
Figure 4). Although very dense, the crowd appeared to be stable in the plaza. Initially, in 
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the piazza, there was no crowd rush in which throngs of people densely packed were 
attempting to move.112 
 
Figure 4.  Turin, Italy: Fans Watching Soccer Match113 
While fans were enjoying the match, someone reportedly set off a firecracker, and 
the response was devastating as patrons believed there had been a gunshot or bomb had 
exploded.114 Unfortunately, the sound created a rush of individuals surging in all directions 
trying to seek safety. The BBC produced a striking video that shows what happened as the 
crowd heard the noise.115 Much like a rock thrown into a pond, a ripple effect of surging 
people overwhelmed those standing near them, knocking them to the ground. Turin Deputy 
Mayor Renato Saccone dismissed the incident as panic, but thousands of fans were so 
densely packed, they could hardly move.116 This surge of people in response to the 
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firecracker noise resulted in injuring more than 1,500 people in an instant.117 Hundreds of 
shoes were torn from the fans’ feet as the crowd rush happened. Parents and children were 
separated and initially unable to find one another.118  
3. Earthquake 
In contrast to the crowd crush incident at Turin, a Bay Area earthquake brought a 
different response at Candlestick Park Stadium in 1989. The World Series was held in San 
Francisco and dubbed the “Battle of the Bay.” The Oakland A’s and San Francisco Giants 
hosted a packed stadium with thousands of fans for game three of the series.119 Before the 
first pitch was thrown, a massive 6.9 earthquake hit the Bay Area.120 Footage and photos 
captured the historical tragedy on almost every live sports show. When the earthquake 
erupted, the fans began running toward the baseball field as they were called out by the 
players; they used the field as an area of safe refuge.121 In anticipation of injuries, police 
and ambulance crews also drove onto the field. Although people were frightened, there was 
no sign of crowd rush or injury from the fans trying to get to the field; some stayed in their 
seats, afraid to move.122 There was no available information as to the reason for the fans 
remained unharmed in this incident. Perhaps it was due to the large area of safety provided 
by the baseball field and the ability of the crowd to remain calm. Or possibly the high 
concentration of fans moving to the sparsely populated baseball field, which held a low 
concentration of people. Unfortunately, 63 people were killed and more than 3,000 were 
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injured as they tried to escape the damage from the from the 6.9 earthquake in the 
surrounding cities of San Francisco and Oakland.123   
4. Crowd Response to Terrorist Action 
Manchester, United Kingdom was a recent site of multiple injuries and fatalities at 
a May 2017 Ariana Grande concert. The live concert at the Manchester Arena was part of 
her international music tour.124 As the performance was ending, and thousands of young 
fans began leaving the arena, an explosion rocked the building. In a foyer outside the front 
doors, a bomb killed 22 people, including the bomber, and injured almost 60 people.125 
The concert-goers made their way to exits to escape possible injury. People were taken to 
eight area hospitals reportedly seeing metal nuts, used as shrapnel to increase the number 
of injuries, on the floor of the foyer.126 The fans at the concert did not initially know there 
was an attack, necessitating security to broadcast the incident. Witnesses report some fans 
pushing children and a person in a wheelchair aside so they could exit.  
Police, fire, and EMS arrived to manage the scene with thousands of patrons that 
initially filled the Manchester arena and to provide care and transport for the injured fans. 
Video provided by the media of the mitigation of the scene focused on the front of the 
community center, leading to the assumption that it was the only exit in use.127 
Additionally, the media has provided some film clips of people running to the front exits 
directed by security. It is unknown whether people used the side or rear exits to leave the 
building more quickly. 
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Britain fell victim to another terrorist attack on June 3, 2017 on the London Bridge 
and at Borough Market.128 People were walking across the bridge and toward Borough 
Market on Saturday evening when three people in a van ran down several tourists. The 
three suspects got out of the van and began stabbing people as they ran toward the market 
area. Eight people were either run down by a vehicle or stabbed to death, while scores of 
others were injured. The Islamic State group took responsibility for the attack as they 
shouted, “This is for Allah.”129 Tourists began fighting back during the terrorist attack. For 
example, Ignacio Echeverria attempted to stop a terrorist from stabbing a woman on the 
bridge.130 He was joined by several others who also tried to fight off the attackers while 
waiting for police response.131 A baker, off-duty policeman, banker, and other citizens put 
their lives in danger at the marketplace while waiting for help to arrive.132 The 
circumstances in this incident are different from other instances in this chapter. For one, it 
took place in two distinct areas, starting at the bridge and traveling to the market place. 
Also, the attacked venues had relatively few citizens compared to large crowds at planned 
events. However, the streets, tables, and chairs that lined the market place created barriers 
and bottlenecks, slowing the crowd’s ability to exit. People did run to find safety, but they 
also had the presence of mind to help others in a life-threatening situation. Panic is not 
always people’s response in an emergency. People can make sound decisions to help 
themselves and others.133  
D. CONCLUSION 
Chapter II discussed how people gather at venues for pleasure, entertainment, and 
worship. Unfortunately, the events can draw large crowds and people are unable to 
effectively move to safety. As crowds move like fluid, as described by Helbing, Johansson, 
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and Al-Abideen, they become hampered by individual decisions and bottlenecks in areas 
that slow the leading edge of crowds, and this can cause injury and death.134 The 
unfortunate phenomenon of crowd movement has created problems for emergency services 
trying to prevent injury at large events. It is often difficult to navigate through a crowd and 
can become dangerous for the responders as well. This was illustrated by the example of 
the concert in Minsk, Belarus when two police officers were accidentally killed while 
trying to control a crowd rushing to find shelter from an unexpected hail storm during a 
concert.  
The research has examined outdoor events to compare people’s responses to 
emergencies and the resulting injuries. The data collected will help determine how fire 
departments can provide consistent planning, support, and care at events. The findings may 
also contribute to a cohesive working atmosphere for all emergency services by 
collaboratively sharing information and working together. Sharing data can produce 
lessons learned and best practices that may prove helpful for future events. 
The next chapter discusses issues related to fire departments and their ability to 
provide appropriate staffing and equipment. In addition, the chapter explores response to 
incidents and the relative time needed to arrive to a scene. Risk is discussed as it applies to 
events to prevent incidents from occurring. The goal is to provide safety for the public. 
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III. FIRE DEPARTMENT FRAMEWORK 
Circus master P.T. Barnum was not the first person to recognize the importance of 
moving people safely to an exit. However, he was innovative in the way he moved hordes 
of people who jammed into his tents to see the wonders of his circus. Barnum’s marketing 
acumen led him to remove the exit signs and install signs that read “This way to the Egress” 
to prevent people from staying too long at exhibts and preventing others from seeing the 
attractions.135 Not knowing the definition of the word egress, the crowds moved through 
the “egress” doors as they closed and locked behind them, preventing their return. Barnum 
had found a way to move people efficiently and safely. 136  
Scientists and engineers have tried to achieve what Barnum did both inside 
buildings and at outside venues for many years. The professionals’ primary goal is safe, 
expedient entry and exiting for employees and patrons so as to prevent incidents. Early in 
the twentieth century, there were several tragedies due to fires and lack of adequate 
exiting.137 The loss of life prompted fire and building officials to change fire codes and 
ordinances to protect people.138 Over a hundred years later, safety research continues. This 
chapter looks at some of the fundamental considerations for developing a safe atmosphere 
for patrons at large venues. A complete safety plan cannot be developed without knowing 
capabilities and probablities in advance as well as by looking at historical events.  
A. ASSESSING RISK 
Determining risk before an event or during an incident requires some deductive 
reasoning by reverse engineering. While planning for an event, fire departments must bring 
all interested parties to the table and ask questions about the scope of work and services 
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they are to provide. Understanding the event and the equipment that will be used gives fire 
departments a starting point to look for possible safety threats. As Vose suggests, inspectors 
must allow the required work to drive the needs for the assessment, rather than allowing 
the assessment to drive the need.139 Additionally, it is important for fire departments to ask 
the organizers about suspected problems that may occur involving individuals or groups at 
the planned venue.140 When planning for a large event, there are several things for fire 
departments to consider, including fire safety, law enforcement, logistics for equipment, 
crowd numbers, and weather. It is important to understand what risks are involved before 
attempting to determine the event’s value. 
Risk is the possibility of an unplanned event happening, causing danger and/or 
injury. Should the risk occur, it is unfavorable for the participants at the venue.141 The risk 
investigators’ responsibility is to look for gaps, problems, and possibility of failure. 
Moreover, the risk investigators must evaluate the sources of the problems to determine 
the impact the deficiency. Lastly, investigators must be vigilant in their approach to identify 
and mitigate known risks to provide safety for the venue. 
Assessing risk can also prevent new incidents from occurring at an event that is 
already in progress, which allows the operation to progress more smoothly. There are many 
things that can decrease risk at a venue and increase safety. Some of the possibilities are:  
 Provide specific lanes for supply vehicles and emergency equipment apart 
from the crowd location for safety.142  
 Look for electrical, plumbing, and environmental concerns.143  
 Determine the type of barriers needed to prevent injury and allow safe exit 
or entry.  
 Designate areas for cooking and related equipment to prevent the possibility 
of fire and safety hazards.  
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 Continually check the weather and be prepared for wind, rain, or 
thunderstorms at outside venues.144  
 Ensure professionalism, credentialing, and training of those who are 
involved in the program and their employees. 
 Secure the incident command post from unauthorized entry.  
Fire department evaluators must maintain and continually update lists from previous risk 
assessments indicating areas of possible deficiency.  Retaining such lists provides a 
reference for future venue inspections. The information collected may also indicate trends 
for future ordinance or safety code changes. The importance of properly executed risk 
assessments is paramount since they pertain to public safety.  
Risk assessments must also account for people. For example, firefighters 
conducting a risk assessment must consider the demographics of the individuals those who 
are involved in an incident or attending the venue.145 The individuals may be 
predominately young, like those at the Arianna Grande concert in Manchester, and in need 
of the assistance of adults.146 Alternatively, the venue may be a mixture of ages with some 
needing assistance with wheelchairs, walkers, or strollers. The assessment should include 
safe exit paths for individuals who can walk on their own and alternative means for those 
with disabilities. Fire department planners must anticipate problems before allowing a 
venue to open that could result in injury the public. Therefore, a risk assessment is 
paramount to determine the level of safety required at a given event. It should also include 
the degree of risk the venue organizers are willing to accept during the event.  
B. STAFFING STANDARDS AND RATINGS 
Fire departments have guidelines for their capabilities and response to serve the 
public. The National fire Protection Assoctiation (NFPA) and the Insurance Services 
Office (ISO) are organizations that establish standards for the number of firefighters and 
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equipment responding to a given type of emergency.147 Working in concert, NFPA and 
ISO also provide standards for municipality water system infrastructure to combat fires.148 
NFPA alone is responsible for producing more than 300 codes that cover firefighters and 
equipment requirements.149 The codes are for all aspects of building and life safety. For 
example, NFPA 1710 provides information for the deployment of professional firefighters 
(paid) going to emergencies. The standard covers fire, EMS, wildland, airports, water, and 
other problems encountered by firefighters.150 Similarly, NFPA 1720 covers the same 
situations for volunteer fire (unpaid) agencies.  
Both professional and volunteer agencies are held to a strict standard requiring the 
shortest average response time to an emergency and to ensuring public safety. As it is 
unable to publish information for every conceivable type of emergency, NFPA has 
produced several general response scenarios and provided standard acceptable response 
times. The national standards establish safety for people, property, and animals. For 
example, NFPA 1720 indicates standard response times for volunteer firefighters 
responding to a 2,000 square-foot (sq.-ft.) home on fire.151 Table 1 is an example of typical 
response standards to help the reader understand basic operations since NFPA does not 
develop standards specifically for outdoor venues. It is important also to note that for those 
occurrences and emergencies that may unforeseen, the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) 
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determines the response capabilities.152 Outside venues would fall under special risks in 
Table 1,153 and the responsibility of the decision falls on the AHJ.154  
Table 1.   4.4.2 NFPA 1720 Volunteer Firefighter Response  
(2000 sq. ft. Home)155 







Urban area >1000 people/mi2 15 9 90 
Suburban area 500–1000 people/mi2 10 10 80 
Rural area <500 people/mi2 6 14 80 
Remote area 







Special risks Determined by AHJ 
Determined by 





an A jurisdiction can have more than one demand zone. 
b Minimum staffing includes members responding from the AHJs department and automatic aid 
c Response time begins upon completion of the dispatch notification and ends at the time interval 
shown in the table. 
 
The ISO uses a rating system that scores fire departments depending on whether 
their firefighters are paid professionals or volunteers.156 The Fire Suppression Rating 
Schedule uses four different categories to establish an ISO score.157 ISO and fire 
departments use it to measure the emergency mitigation capability of departments for the 
areas they serve. Departments achieve a rating by having emergency communications, an 
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operational fire department (professional or volunteer), available pressurized water supply 
(fire hydrants), and a fire protection bureau.158 When fire departments receive a low score, 
it can affect the insurance rating of local government, municipalities, and individual 
property owner’s insurance premiums.159 It is crucial to achieve the best rating to ensure 
safety and reliability for the public while keeping insurance costs to a minimum.160 Fire 
department staffing and capabilities correlate directly with a good ISO rating. It indicates 
that the infrastructure and fire department can mitigate emergencies in the areas they 
protect.  
C. COMMON ISSUES OFTEN GO UNNOTICED 
The focus of this research is crowd movement at outside events and their safety. 
The following section describes issues that may not be considered during planning or 
assessing the capabilities of a fire department. Each is important in its ability to decrease 
or increase the stability management at an outside event. Developing proper management 
at the scene of an event can bring order and decrease the time to mitigate any emergencies 
that may arise. 
1. Self-Dispatching Creates Problems 
Self-dispatch (self-deployment) is a term used by emergency departments 
indicating that an engine, truck, or medic company has taken it upon itself to deploy to an 
emergency without being summoned by a dispatcher.161 Emergencies at crowded venues 
can attract self-dispatching from fire companies that are not part of the assigned equipment. 
It is human nature want to help during an emergency, more so when one is trained to assist 
injured people. However, self-dispatching often leads to chaos at the emergency scene.162 
Fire companies who deploy themselves are not part of the planned dispatch and therefore 
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are unknown to command as they arrive on the scene. Upon arrival, these new personnel 
must be plugged into the system and given direction in a situation that may have already 
been set up and organized. Command is responsible for communicating a plan to arriving 
fire and EMS companies.163 Emergency responders who self-deploy may become part of 
the emergency and hinder designated operations because dispatch did not account for them.  
2. Mutual Aid Distributes Resources for the State and Nation 
Fire departments enter into agreements with local, state, and federal agencies to 
assist during emergencies requiring additional personnel and equipment for short periods. 
Their use may be for any type of emergency including wildfires, floods, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, or manmade disasters, whether accidental or intentional.164 There is not enough 
money in every department to supply equipment and personnel for every disaster that may 
arise. As a result, mutual aid agreements have evolved between departments to provide a 
means for requesting and lending assistance when one department does not have the full 
resources to mitigate an emergency. However, provisions in the agreements do not mandate 
that departments respond when called. Mutual aid is a tool to obtain help when available 
equipment is ready to react and routinely crosses jurisdictional boundaries. When fire 
department resources are depleted and unable to fulfill their agreement, the requesting 
department goes to the next available department on the master mutual aid list, which is 
maintained by state and federal agencies.  
An important aspect of a mutual aid agreement is cost recovery for fire departments. 
Although the agreements are for short periods, multiple intrastate or federal requests for 
help can be made annually in California, for example, incurring a significant cost to 
responding agencies. Fire department’s demand for reimbursement from the state or federal 
governments to repair fire apparatus and pay for labor can cause a burden on fire agencies. 
The losses a department experiences could lead to dropping out of a mutual aid program 
and decrease the statewide available pool of fire apparatus and crews. To prevent this 
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problem from arising, in 2004, FEMA developed Recovery Policy No. 9523.6 to ensure 
recovery of costs incurred during mutual aid deployments.165 Cost recovery is a common 
area of concern for departments due to limited budgets and the time it takes to receive 
reimbursement from government agencies. Lessening the burden of labor and maintenance 
increases the possibility of executing mutual aid agreements.  
3. Automatic Aid Helps Locally 
Automatic aid is like mutual aid; however, it is used for a local response from 
neighboring departments.166 For example, Sacramento Metro Fire, Folsom Fire, 
Sacramento City Fire, and Cosumnes Fire in California all have common jurisdictional 
boundaries and are partnered together by an automatic aid agreement. When emergency 
calls deplete available personnel and equipment, Sacramento Regional Fire Dispatch sends 
equipment from a neighboring department to the call. Depending on the type of emergency, 
units may respond from one, two, or all four agencies to mitigate the incident. When 
departments form an agreement, they need to consider the type of equipment and capability 
each respective department owns. Responding agencies must share the same capabilities 
as their neighboring agencies to ensure the same care. An essential aspect of the agreement 
is the rating from the ISO. One might question why ISO determines the acceptance of an 
agreement. As previously stated, ISO rates departments and their capabilities.167 
Consequently, companies having similar staffing, equipment, and capability are contracted 
for services between departments.  
4. Volunteers Provide Valuable Service 
Volunteers work tirelessly to provide a significant and valuable service to the 
members of their community. During extended emergencies, they assemble at the scene 
and work alongside emergency responders to help families restore their lives. Organized 
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charities may manage the services provided like the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, or 
other nonprofit organizations. In addition, there are groups of volunteers that have been 
trained by individual fire departments and law enforcement to respond not only to 
emergencies but to planned events as well.  
The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) members volunteer their 
services in cities and towns for extended periods, providing their services to support fire 
departments and help people. This organization got its start in Los Angeles in 1985.168 By 
1987, the Whittier Narrows earthquake provided to be a proving ground for the newly 
developed CERT members in the Disaster Preparedness Division of the Los Angeles 
County Fire Department.169 By 1993, FEMA recognized the important role CERT held in 
emergencies, so the agency helped with training for individuals who wanted to become 
members.170 As the program developed, the responsibility of CERT members morphed 
from disaster preparedness to medical operations, search, rescue, disaster psychology, 
organization, safety watch, and assistance at large venues.171 Like firefighters, CERT 
members are called on for many tasks. They are professional and attend regular training 
and classes to maintain their certifications. Furthermore, their service is recognized as part 
of the incident command system and shares the same importance as other divisions.  
D. INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM IMPORTANCE 
Planning, organization, and strategy are critical factors that are part of the 
foundation of command. They are combined to direct task oriented tactics to mitigate an 
emergency. As the forward progression of the incident subsides, recovery starts. It is all 
made possible by use of the command system. 
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1. Unified Command 
Problems associated with one of the most devastating and expensive fires in 
California’s history prompted U.S. Congress to authorize the formation of a system that 
would allow mutual operation between agencies.172 It was called the unified command and 
was part of the newly developed Incident Command System (ICS) developed from 1970 
California wildfires. More than 750 fires ignited that year during September and burned 
through October 4, 1970 in California. In just 13 days, 16 people were killed, 700 homes 
were destroyed, and 500,000 acres burned.173 The responsibility of the unified command 
is to bring multijurisdictional agencies together and to prevent overlapping and redundant 
efforts for organization and management at an incident.174 The position differs from a 
single incident commander, who is the sole authority at an incident that developed 
strategies and management. Unified commands share authority among several 
commanders from different agencies. They work together to produce the same structured 
information as a single incident commander.175 The shared authority of supervisors at the 
unified command acts as one team and is able work much more efficiently as a result.  
ICS was continually improved by the original authors: the California Office of 
Emergency Services, U.S. Forestry, California Forestry, and the Los Angeles, Ventura, and 
Santa Barbara County Fire Departments. The departments banded together to form an 
organization known as Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential 
Emergencies, agreeing to use standard system of organization and terminology.176 ICS 
later became part of the National Incident Management System and became required 
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training for all safety employees.177 One of its components, the incident action plan (IAP), 
became one of the most used portions of ICS to distribute command and control. 
2. Incident Action Plan 
The IAP was developed as part of ICS to delineate the roles of individuals involved 
at an event or incident.178 The IAP also includes all personnel, equipment, weather, maps 
of the operational area, operational periods, emergency medical information, and any other 
related information. Additionally, the IAP provides vital information to the members in the 
command structure: safety, liaison, public information officer, operations, planning, 
logistics, and finance are command positions to assist the operational objectives.179 More 
importantly, the IAP provides the strategy and incident objectives at the scene as 
constructed by command. Consequently, the document must be meticulously updated at 
specified operational times, most often 12 or 24-hour periods. The periods allow changes 
in operations or development of the event or incident.180 Additionally, the IAP can develop 
into the small city of individuals and equipment to support and maintain the needs of the 
firefighters working on the fire line. It may be constructed of only a few pages or more 
than a hundred. As an event or incident becomes more dynamic, so does the need for a 
changing plan.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Chapter III has explored many variables that may at first seem unrelated to crowd 
dynamics at outside events. However, it provides information to facilitate an understanding 
of some of the considerations for determining fire department capability, which affect fire 
department response. It is important to provide the services at an outdoor event to maintain 
the safety of the people. The information here further facilitates an understanding of how 
fire departments can develop partnerships with other agencies as a force multiplier when 
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an agency requires additional help. Lastly, this chapter includes discussion on the 
importance of organization and management as well as how using several officials acting 
as one decreases workload and increases efficiency at an incident or event. The next 
chapter, Chapter IV, includes case studies that provide data that may reveal commonalities 
at outside venues to further understand crowd movement during an emergency.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES: A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CROWD 
MOVEMENT AND SAFETY 
The following case studies provide information describing events and crowds that 
have experienced an incident at the venue they are attending. This chapter also discusses 
the planning and direction of public agencies responsible for the safety of attendees at large 
events. This research included data collection and analysis to determine root and 
contributing causes for each event.  
A. CAUSAL FACTORS: FINDING THE PROBLEM 
Causal factor determination for an incident asks the questions to answer who, what, 
when, and why. Problems arising from a given incident may be caused by any number of 
reasons, including human error, policy problems, or mechanical failure. This chapter uses 
portions of the Department of Energy’s Root Cause Analysis Guide to determine causal 
factors for the case studies. The assessment includes four parts. The first step is to establish 
the background and identify the problem with concurrent data collection.181 The second 
step is to establish data on crowd structure.182 The third step is to use the data to establish 
the significance of the problem and identify conditions, actions, and possible causes.183 
The fourth and final step is to establish the root cause(s) for each incident. This research 
uses root cause analysis to determine if the given event could have been prevented by 
corrective action prior to the event.184 These four parts provide a comprehensive look to 
determine a root cause associated with each case study.185 It is also important to be 
objective when gathering data and to avoid making assumptions. The evidence should 
control and direct the investigation to produce the most probable explanation.186  
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B. ROOT CAUSE: PREVENTING RECURRENCE 
This thesis uses root cause analysis to investigate and analyze circumstances 
relating to incidents at large, crowded events. There may be many contributing causes that 
may emerge after an incident. However, it is important to determine the root cause at an 
incident so as to prevent the problem from happening again at another event. The root cause 
at one event may also affect other events differently causing entirely new problems. The 
process for determining a root cause is through a process similar to risk assessment. The 
goal of root cause is to interpret and reveal the specific cause of the incident by providing 
an impartial investigation.187  
C. CASE STUDIES OF CROWD ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY 
The case studies in this chapter are from incidents at outside public venues. The 
researcher chose the events for three reasons. First, they all have significant incidents that 
test the ability of emergency services to mitigate the problem. Second, specific information 
is available on each event can be found in published government reports and analysis. 
Finally, the events are related to crowd movement in an emergency. Each study begins 
with a description of the venue, crowd location, seating (if available), and egress. The 
research includes three variables: crowd structure, causal factors, and root cause. The thesis 
examines and describes crowd structure. The researcher determined causal factors for each 
incident from source information. Finally, this thesis lists the causal factors of the case 
study events and presents the root cause if known. The case studies, arranged 
chronologically, are as follows: 1989 Hillsborough soccer match, 2011 Reno Air Race, the 
2013 Boston Marathon, and the 2014 Travis AFB Air Show.  
1. Hillsborough Soccer Match Tragedy  
Soccer fans entered Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield, England on April 15, 1989, 
with anticipation of watching a match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest.188 They 
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were unaware of several discussions addressing the safety of the outdoor stadium by the 
fire department, the police, and the owners of the stadium.189 Prior to the event, the South 
Yorkshire Fire Commission (SYFC) provided a complete safety inspection to discover 
safety problems at the stadium.190 The stadium had a history of inadequate safety features 
that were life safety concerns and had not yet been resolved properly. The owners had been 
unable to obtain a safety certificate after multiple renovations to enlarge entry turnstiles 
and a tunnel. The tunnel led to areas designated as “pens,” areas to hold patrons.191 The 
pens and their gates had also been renovated and were located at the end of the entrance 
tunnel. Unfortunately, the renovated turnstiles, gates, and the tunnel were significantly 
smaller than the recommended size, which impeded safe exiting.192 
As people began moving through the turnstiles the day of the match, the crowded 
created a bottleneck and forward progress slowed. As the 3:00 p.m. game time drew near, 
police requested holding the start of the game until fans could get inside the stadium. 
Meanwhile, several police officers complained about the problems from the building 
density of the crowd outside the stadium. A police superintendent ordered an officer to 
open a larger gate to allow patrons to enter the stadium; this created a rush of incoming 
fans.193 The resulting crowd crush injured hundreds and killed 96 men, women, and 
children (see Figures 5 and 6).194 Injury and deaths were created by the sudden rush of 
people moving through the side gate. Commonly called crowd crush, the tremendous 
weight and force of the crowd threw people to the ground and against fences, preventing 
them from breathing.195 The coroner’s reports indicated traumatic asphyxia, a sudden 
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inability to breathe, as the cause of death for fans.196 A two-minute YouTube video 
animation produced by Reuters depicts realistic movement of the crowd surging in to see 
the start of the match and also shows the relative numbers of people.197 Although an inquiry 
started in 1989, a trial indicting police officers did not conclude until 2012. People 
complained that the police were in charge of the public safety, and actions by the police 
resulted in death and injury. Police officers were later charged with the deaths and injury 
of fans at the Hillsborough match, while the fire service, EMS, and the stadium owners 
were not included in the indictment.198 Supervising police officer David Duckenfield, Sir 
Norman Bettison, and four additional police officers were charged with the responsibility 
of the incident that took place.199  
 
Figure 5.  Picture of 96 Persons Who Perished at Hillsborough Stadium 1989200 
                                                 
196 Ibid.  
197 News Direct, “Hillsborough Tragedy: A Reconstruction,” YouTube, October 15, 2012, 
https://youtu.be/mCFuQLUD-LQ.  
198 “How the Hillsborough Disaster Happened,” BBC News, April 15, 1989, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/7992845.stm.  
199 Sawer, “What Happened at Hillsborough.”   





Figure 6.  Picture of People Killed by Asphyxia and Pens Where They Died201  
a. Crowd Structure 
Men, women, and children were all hurrying along the streets of Sheffield to arrive 
at the Hillsborough soccer match on time. Many of the fans arrived from other cities via 
mass transit. Because of their various modes and origins of travel, not everyone arrived on 
time for the game at the Hillsborough stadium on Leppings Lane.202 The narrow street 
acted like a funnel moving the crowd closer to the entry turnstiles. The crowd of fans was 
so dense that traffic on the street was unable to move.203 When they were finally able to 
reach the stadium, fans found the crowd had become denser and was not moving due to the 
relatively few number of turnstiles available through which to enter the stadium. People 
began complaining and becoming “unruly, nasty, and violent,” as stated by police 
officers.204 Police officers on foot and horseback were unable to manage the crowd and 
ultimately became part of the initial crowd crush that started outside the turnstiles.205  
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b. Causal Factors 
Several problems at the Hillsborough Stadium contributed to the severity of 
incident. Although many of the fans were already in place at the stadium, many more were 
attempting to get in when the crush occurred. As the time for the match to start drew nearer, 
people become anxious.206 Police realized that the number of turnstiles could not 
accommodate the number of fans.207 Ticketless fans also arrived at the stadium and became 
part of the crowd, adding to the increasing crowd density and slow progression into the 
stadium.208 As one of the officers outside the gate, Officer Roger Marshall requested help 
via radio and asked permission to open the side gates because people were getting crushed 
at the turnstiles. His colleagues in an observation booth recognized the increasing density 
of the crowd; however, Commander Roger Greenwood, operating inside the gates, had no 
knowledge of what was happening or about to happen.209 Thinking it would release the 
tension on the inadequate turnstiles, newly promoted Chief Superintendent David 
Duckenfield gave the order to open the side gate and allow people in.210 When the crush 
began, people were thrown against wire fences and to the ground unable to move.211 
Demands by the police to stop the match as injuries were happening initially went 
unheeded by match officials.212  
The injuries occurred in the pens constructed in 1981 by owners of the stadium. 
These pens were designed to prevent previous problems with fans who were unruly at 
matches.213 The pens were also designed to prevent patrons from getting onto the playing 
field, which was a constant problem at games, and fighting with fans from the opposing 
teams. The pens proved to be a significant part of the problem since people were pushed 
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into them by the crowd’s rush.214 The walkway leading to the pen openings was at a steep 
angle, which increased the speed of traffic into the pens.215 Investigators cited the width of 
the gate doors as part of the reason for the crowd crush; they were not wide enough to allow 
proper entry or exit.216 The capacity of each of the five pens was 1,600 people; however, 
there were an estimated 2,200 people in each of two center pens at the time of the crush.217 
The final Hillsborough report stated police officers kept pen exit gates closed and locked. 
Having the gates locked posed an exit hazard that the fire department had not addressed in 
its planning.218 However, lack of police gate monitoring proved to be a key component of 
the problems with the pens.219  
When the injuries started, police called for ambulances to assist the injured. 
Unfortunately, the dense crowd prevented medics from arriving in a timely manner. As the 
ambulance crews tried to drive their vehicles near the pen areas, fans and police officers 
attempted to help move the critically injured and perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 
The medics on the ambulances were also overwhelmed and unable to establish treatment 
and triage areas to manage patients and their transport to hospital.220 The ambulance 
services did not alert local hospitals about the multicasualty incident, which meant that 
hospitals did not prepare in time for the number of people arriving.221 As a result, the 
number of patients arriving quickly overwhelmed the hospital’s emergency room 
capability.222  
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SYFC had relatively little involvement at the scene but were instrumental in 
preliminary planning and reporting of issues of concern with the safety of the stadium.223 
SYFC became understandably concerned for the safety and welfare of fans due to the 
radical changes installed by the owners of the stadium three years prior, preventing the free 
flow of pedestrian traffic.224 SYFC also stressed the need for the owners to provide a valid 
safety inspection and certificate before allowing the use of stadiums; however, police did 
not think it was necessary.225 Additionally, SYFC understood and agreed with police that 
fans were causing many of the problems associated with challenging police authoity at 
matches.226 However, they asserted, the safety and security of the fans was a greater 
concern that needed to be addressed by the police.227 Still, neither the fire department nor 
the police developed a plan for large crowds attending an event at the stadium.228  
SYFC and the stadium owners used a publication called the Guide to Safety at 
Sports Grounds (Green Guide) to calculate tolerances with crowd numbers.229 The Green 
Guide is an internationally accepted and consulted guide for all aspects of safety at sports 
venues, including safe exiting.230 SYFC informed the owners and police of the failure to 
comply with the guide, yet the owners made no changes for safety.231 Information in the 
guide also indicated the areas in question for crowd density should be evacuated in eight 
minutes or less should there be an emergency. The calculation determined by SYFC 
indicated that exiting would take more than 11 minutes to evacuate each area.232 The 
owners of the stadium also made many safety calculations that fell short of the required 
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minimums as reported by SYFC, but neither police nor EMS overseeing safety security 
and management did anything about the problems.233 SYFC reported its calculations for 
safe exiting prior to the match, indicating passages and the areas around the pens and in 
the tunnels leading to the pens were too narrow and crowd density too large.234  
c. Root Cause 
Lord Justice Taylor chaired the independent panel that examined the incident at 
Hillsborough. The final report of the panel indicated that the responsibility for the 
Hillsborough incident fell on stadium owners, police, EMS, and fire services.235 His 
statement directly contradicted 1989 comments by the police, who blamed the fans for the 
crowd crush.236 Additionally, Taylor reported three reasons for the Hillsborough tragedy: 
layout of the grounds, the opening of the gate near the turnstiles, and the build-up of the 
crowd. He stated that the grounds were the responsibility of police and fire; however, they 
were not able to control crowd movement and instill safety.237 Although unchallenged in 
their remarks, Taylor and the Hillsborough Independent Panel concluded that there are 
relatively few times when one single cause can be attributed to an incident.238 Although 
the panel reported that the responsibility belonged to the owners and all of emergency 
services, in 2012, British court claimed the police were at fault for the incident at 
Hillsborough in 1989.239 There were many contributing factors that caused the incident at 
Hillsborough. It is important to note the list of problems that contributed to the tragedy:  
 Large crowd was unable to move through the available turnstiles. 
 Ticketless fans were part of the crowd and contributing to the crowd density 
and inability to move smoothly through the few turnstiles available. 
 Police were becoming part of the crowd and its inability to move. 
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 Police were overwhelmed by the crowd numbers. 
 Inadequate leadership by the newly appointed police supervisor prevented 
proper. command. 
 Side gate was opened to relieve crowd pressure on the turnstiles. 
 Crowd crush  
 Pens were the location for the crowd crush.  
 Victims were pushed to the ground and against fences and unable to breathe. 
 Inadequate and flawed design of the fences, tunnel, and walkway. 
 Ambulances were not staged at the event, consequently slowing their 
response. 
 EMS personnel could not drive near the pens where the incident occurred 
due the crowd density 
 Ambulance supervisors did not alert the hospitals of the multicasualty 
incident. 
 Hospital emergency rooms were overwhelmed. 
 SYFC reported the stadium did not comply with fire and exiting standards 
prior to the incident.  
 There were more fans than there was available space, as confirmed by the 
Green Guide.  
2. Reno Air Race 
Beginning in 1964, the annual Reno Air Race has been staged annually for more 
than 50 years.240 It has grown from a dirt runway with a few spectators to more than 
150,000 fans over a four-day weekend.241 On September 16, 2011 almost 30,000 fans 
arrived in one day at the Reno-Stead Airport parking lot, making their way to the bleachers 
and boxed seating areas.242 During one of the races, all the aircraft turned the corner at 
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pylon eight, flying the designated course directly at the seated crowd,  indicated by Figures 
7 and 8. At one point, a single aircraft lost control and crashed into the crowd.243 It struck 
the boxed area where there were comparatively fewer spectators than those seated in the 
grandstands. However, the impact was devastating (see Figures 7–10).244 Spectators 
witnessed the incident, which killed 11 people and injured more than 60.245 Crashes are 
not uncommon at the race; however, precautions have been taken to prevent problems.  
 
Figure 7.  Satellite Photo with Course Overlay246 
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Figure 8.  Race Course Schematic: Note Accident Site in Box near Pylon 8247  
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Figure 9.  Trim Tab Missing on Aircraft248 
 
Figure 10.  Impact of Aircraft249 
                                                 
248 Source: Mike Danko, “NTSB Cites Flutter as Cause of Reno Air Race Crash,” Aviation Law 
Monitor [blog], August 29, 2012, http://www.aviationlawmonitor.com/tags/p51-crash-at-reno/.  
249 Source: Jesse McKinley, “Spectators’ Deaths Highlight Risk of Popular Aerial Racing,” New York 
Times, September 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/us/reno-air-show-crash.html. 
 56
At an air race such as the one in Reno, crowd protection is paramount, and this 
prompts annual inspections and planning. The Reno Fire Department trained in scenarios 
to ensure proper response by its assets and emergency medical services.250 Training 
included both tabletop and live scenarios to replicate possible incidents.251 For example, 
representatives from the local emergency services, emergency management, county 
medical examiner, Air and Army National Guard, county hospitals, coroner’s office, and 
law enforcement participated in an exercise with four scenarios with live actors on May 
25, 2011.252 , Also prior to the race, on June 2, 2011, representatives from the same 
agencies participated in a table top exercise that simulated 23 fatalities and 46 injured 
individuals.253 Having received specific instructions for their mock injuries, volunteer 
actors wore makeup to provide a realistic scene for the exercise. These exercises provided 
real-world training to mimic actual situations with time monitoring to determine response, 
treatment and transport of patients, and scene mitigation.  
a. Crowd Structure 
On September 17, 2011, people of all demographics quickly filled the aluminum 
bleachers and preferred box seating area. The third day of air races was as successful as the 
prior two days, generating significant crowd numbers.254 The majority of the crowd was 
seated on elevated bleachers and packed tightly to fill the available space, while more than 
1,000 were at ground level in a preferred area located in front of the bleachers.  
b. Causal Factors 
The weather posed no significant issues during this incident as per National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The temperature was 82 degrees with winds from 
the southwest at 15 mph. According to a 2011 NTSB report, there were also expected 21 
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mph gusts with visibility of 10 miles. The information is a standard weather briefing given 
before flight by the National Weather Service and is essential for safe flying.255  
The portion of the crowd sitting on the bleachers had less individual seating space 
per person than the fans in the preferred area, decreasing the ability of the fans in the 
bleachers to exit swiftly in an emergency (see Figure 11). Preferred seating had sectioned 
areas with tables, chairs, and umbrellas, and the space could not accommodate the same 
density of patrons as people seated on the bleachers (see yellow highlighted area in Figure 
12). As shown in Figure 11, the positions of the seating were built for spectators to obtain 
the best view of the air races.  
 
Figure 11.  Elevated Grandstands256 
                                                 
255 NTSB, Pilot/Race 177, The Galloping Ghost.  
256 Source: Shawna Malvini Redden, “Mourning the 2011 Reno Air Races,” The Bluest Muse [blog], 
September 18, 2011, http://www.bluestmuse.com/2011/09/mourning-2011-reno-air-races/.  
 58
 
Figure 12.  Reno Air Race with Boxed Seating in Yellow with Elevated 
Grandstands257 
During the third race, the pilot flying the Galloping Ghost (P-51D) began to 
experience fluttering in the fuselage of the aircraft as he flew at almost 500 mph.258 High-
speed photography captured evidence that would later reveal several faulty items were 
critical to the plane’s structural stability. The NTSB determined that there were several 
critical factors on the aircraft indicating reasons for structural failure, among them were:  
 Windscreen and canopy ajar, and are normally closed in flight.259 
 Wrinkles in the skin aft of the wings were found on both sides, indicating 
structural failure.260 
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 The tail wheel was in the down position, which is normally up while 
flying.261 
 The pilot was not visible in the cockpit, indicating that he was not in control 
of the aircraft and very possibly unconscious due to gravitational forces.262 
 The trim tab broke off the aircraft’s left horizontal elevator preventing 
normal flight. (as seen in Figure 7).263  
History of the work done on the Galloping Ghost reveals several changes were 
made.264 The owner of Galloping Ghost and his team continually modified the aircraft to 
achieve better results for racing.265 The modifications made by the Galloping Ghost crew 
were undocumented and without drawings.266 The problems multiplied since the owners 
of the aircraft did not complete an analysis on the modified structure to prove its 
airworthiness—a crucial factor, according to the NTSB.267 Additionally, there was no 
inspection or authorization by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which would 
have provided certification only if the craft proved safe and airworthy. The Reno Air Race 
Association (RARA) was responsible for authorizing aircraft to fly. The application 
submitted by the pilot declared that there were no modifications done on his plane, and the 
RARA accepted this.268 Upon interviewing ground crew and other associates, the NTSB 
could not determine reasons for many of the modifications on the aircraft. Some of the 
changes caused opposite aerodynamic effects, which affected speed and stability.269 Most 
important was the change to the control surfaces, a small horizontal wing (a called trim 
tab) at the rear of the aircraft located on the rear elevators (shown in Figure9). The tabs are 
small, movable surfaces that the pilot adjusts to relieve pressure on the control stick and 
decrease pilot effort during flight. Inexplicably, the trim tab on the right side of the aircraft 
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in a fixed position while the trim tab on the left had been modified with larger bolts to hold 
it onto the aircraft and untested before the race.270  
During the race, the aircraft began to flutter under the stress of the modifications, 
causing the nuts holding the modified trim tab to loosen.271 The high stress on the parts 
caused them to fail, sending the aircraft spiraling up, until the leading edge of the wings 
stalled, rendering the pilot unconscious due to gravitational forces. The plane then quickly 
spiraled down into the boxed seating section where the impact took the lives of 11 people 
and injured many more.272 
All fans were seated and in direct line of the failed aircraft. Additionally, the 
majority seated on bleachers, that were up to 30 rows high, slowing the crowd’s ability to 
exit. Patrons located in the box seating area were surrounded by tables, chairs, and 
partitions, which made exiting slow and cumbersome as evidenced by a YouTube video of 
the scene of the crash.273 The video also shows how quickly the incident happened. People 
were unable to react prior to the impact.274 However, after the impact, they responded 
slowly and methodically, without panic.275 The crowd response to the emergency remained 
uncoordinated but calm as spectators exited and attempted to help family and friends.276 
Firefighters and other emergency responders staged at scene began immediately treating 
trauma victims at the scene. 
The plane crashed straight down into the ground, which meant that it did not slide 
a great distance, and this meant fewer injuries. However, the force of the impact was so 
great that parts of the aircraft flew off and traveled great distances, severing body parts and 
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creating massive head injuries.277 The injuries were horrific and challenged the experience 
and knowledge of firefighters on scene, who have never dealt with this level of trauma.278 
However, the training just three months earlier helped firefighters bring order to the scene. 
Firefighters quickly set up treatment and triage and ordered additional ambulances.279 Off-
duty firefighters and civilians also came from the crowd to help take care of the injured,280 
They worked alongside firefighters, packaging patients, and attempting to stop their 
bleeding. Several witnesses noticed the calm way the fire department managed and 
mitigated the scene, transporting all critical patients in just over an hour.281  
c. Root Cause 
The root cause of the Reno Air Race incident was due to many mechanical errors 
and failures on the aircraft, according to the NTSB.282 The data analyzed in this research 
also found that the pilot of the failed aircraft did not fill out paperwork properly. The RARA 
application submitted by the pilot declared that there were no modifications done to his 
aircraft in the previous two years. Additionally, the RARA failed to confirm the 
information that would have prevented the pilot and aircraft from flying in the race. 
Moreover, the pilot and his team elected to make modifications on the plane without testing 
or receiving proper approval, which ultimately cost people their lives.  
The focus of this study is examination of crowd response in emergencies. However, 
it is necessary to include information about the aircraft incident to understand what 
happened and how the crowd was affected. Below is a list of contributing causes:  
 Dense crowd was seated directly in the flight path of aircraft traveling at 
high speeds. 
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 Additional exiting, which would have allowed people to leave the area 
faster, was not indicated or noted in the research. 
 Preferred seating area was boxed in by fences and multiple tables, chairs, 
and umbrellas, which prevented swift exiting of people. 
 Fences around preferred seating area were not solid and did not provide 
protection from flying debris. 
 Incorrectly filled out RARA report by pilot and owner of Galloping Ghost.  
 RARA did not verify information on the application submitted by the pilot. 
Reasons for the successful responses by the fire department are as follows: 
 Fire department and multiple agencies planned for a multicasualty incident 
prior to the race. 
 Hospitals and the healther departments were involved with event planning.  
 Fire department was staged on scene during the race.  
 Ambulance companies were staged on scene at the race.  
 Off-duty firefighters and civilians assisted with patient care.  
3. Boston Marathon 
In Boston, all emergency response agencies, trauma hospital officials, Office of 
Emergency Management officials and more than 40 other associated agencies involved 
with the 2013 marathon were part of planning.283 The race had taken place the third 
Monday of every April since 1897.284 The focus of this case study is not on the terrorist 
activity; rather, it is a study of the reaction from the public agencies, spectators, and runners 
during a disaster. The planner’s strategy covered the beginning of the race 26.2 miles away 
and extended to the finish line in downtown Boston. Planning focused on the health and 
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safety of every citizen along the route, whether they were athletes or fans.285 Cytel 
Corporation’s James Baker, who assisted with planning for emergencies, said there were 
not many cities that planned for possible problems like Boston did.286  
The race started on time and without incident, allowing almost all the runners to 
reach the finish line. At 2:59 p.m., with 5,000 athletes left to complete the race, an 
explosion rocked several buildings near the finish line.287 When the explosion occurred, it 
created a wave of people attempting to flee the area. Then, approximately 15 seconds later, 
a second explosion erupted approximately 500 feet away from the first blast indicated by 
the pictograph (see Figure 13).288 The second bomb confused people, and they changed 
direction in a fight to save their lives. The blasts killed three people, injured 264, and left 
16 with traumatic amputations.289 Much like the incident at the Reno air race, victims 
sustained horrific injuries, causing tremendous blood loss.  
People ran to the injured and began helping with triage and making bandages to 
assist the injured in a heroic attempt to save lives. Many people attempted to stop victim’s 
bleeding by applying tourniquets made from belts and shirts to stave off the shock and 
probable death.290 Boston trauma surgeons later hailed the use of tourniquets as a probable 
lifesaver for many of the victims.291 People helping patients continued to work with first 
responders, who arrived very quickly on the scene. Everyone continued to work together, 
moving the patients to the triage area. All critically ill patients were triaged and made ready 
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for transport within 40 minutes.292 Although some patients were transported by cars, 73 
ambulances had been committed to the incident and delivered all viable patients to trauma 
centers.293 
 
Figure 13.  Boston Marathon Explosion Locations near Finish Line294 
a. Crowd Structure 
More than 27,000 people lined up at the starting line in Hopkinton, Massachusetts, 
on April 15, 2013 for the annual Boston Marathon.295 The diverse crowd of athletes were 
from around the globe, bringing their trainers, family, and friends to help them along the 
course. They were cheered to the finish line by fans who lined the streets from every town 
along the way. The runners trekked through eight towns on their way to downtown Boston 
on Boylston Street to the finish line.296  
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b. Causal Factors 
Months in advance of the Boston Marathon, several agencies met to develop a mock 
training exercise in preparation for emergencies.297 The Massachusetts Emergency 
Management Agency put together a team that included all emergency responders, 
Emergency Operations Center, Office of Emergency Services, National Guard, Boston 
Athletic Association, Department of Health, FAA, and many other agencies to form a 
cohesive training group.298 The group also included officials from all emergency responder 
agencies in the three counties that would be affected along the 26.2-mile route for the race. 
Their directive from the state of Massachusetts was to train for almost any conceivable 
catastrophe and how it could be mitigated. Another goal was for stakeholders to network 
before the event rather than exchange business cards at the scene.299 The group learned 
very early the way to get work done quickly and efficiently was to know the people 
involved.300 Additionally, the group was dedicated to training and preparation from the 
beginning of the race in Hopkinton to the end in Boston.301  
Assistance from the Department of Homeland Security played a major role by 
issuing a grant for homeland security. Boston was designated as a tier 1 U.S. city by the 
Department of Homeland Security, since it had a high likelihood of a terrorist event.302 
The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) allocated 500 billion dollars in fiscal 2012 to 
31 different American cities for equipment and training; Boston’s share was 11 million 
dollars.303 The training exercise with all agencies that were part of safety planning in 
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Boston was called Urban Shield.304 To the exercise, Boston used UASI grant money and 
hired the CyTel Corporation. This corporation sets up and manages exercises like Urban 
Shield and is nationally a recognized provider with the best system for preparation and 
mitigation of incidents.305 The exercise in 2011 involved 50 agencies and more than 600 
people.306  
The dedication of the working group did not stop at training meetings. Responders 
and related agencies used some of the UASI money to purchase interoperable radios, so all 
agencies could communicate easily among themselves and medical staff during the 
marathon.307 They also staged emergency ambulance units and EMS along the course. In 
addition to the ambulances, there were medical tents set up to provide care for runners and 
patrons. The tents were staffed with paramedics, nurses, and doctors at one-mile intervals; 
police and fire personnel were also staged along the way.308 During the race, there were an 
additional 16 ambulances staged near the finish line and out of what became the blast 
area.309 Kurt N. Schwartz, Undersecretary of Homeland Security and the director of 
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, recognized the work and diligence put 
forth in the planning and training prior to the marathon.310 He further recognized that this 
type of leadership was reminiscent of the homeland security enterprise in “all five mission 
areas―prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.”311  
Crowded streets presented some problems for pedestrian movement after the bombs 
went off, but there were no incidents of crowd crush reported. Interlocking bicycle fencing, 
blocked side streets, public transportation, and closed shelters all contributed to the 
difficulty in finding an easy exit for people fleeing from the bomb scene. Bicycle fencing 
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had been used to separate race fans on the sidewalks from the athletes running the race. 
The fencing interlocks and is almost impossible to take apart. It is used to funnel fans either 
right or left along the street they were standing on, not always in the proper direction, 
causing some to run toward incident scene.312 The fencing also prevented fire, EMS, and 
police from gaining quick access to injured victims initially.313 Public servants and their 
vehicles also became barriers for people trying exit on side streets. Egress was limited and 
prevented entirely on side streets in several areas due to incoming emergency responders 
who were trying to arrive at the scene.314 Transit police shut down all modes of public 
transportation to decrease the chances of the bombing suspects escaping. However, the 
closure almost stopped the crowd’s ability to exit the scene.315 Buses and shelters had been 
staged and made available to the runners in the event of an emergency; however, the buses 
were cancelled since they were not used earlier in the day. Shelters were not staffed or 
opened since most of the runners had finished the race, which meant runners had to look 
elsewhere for a safe place to stay.316  
c. Root Cause 
In preparation for the marathon, public agencies had formed a mutual aid system 
for eight different cities to act as one.317 Planners methodically calculated the entire race 
and envisioned and planned for most every conceivable calamity with prevention, 
preparation, and mitigation as their foundation.318 Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
prevent for the acts committed by the suspects, who placed improvised explosives in the 
crowd near the finish line—this was the root cause of the Boston Marathon bombing. The 
response by the trained professionals and the unexpected help and response from the public 
was tantamount to the successful mitigation of the medical emergency; the results of the 
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bombing could have been far worse. The following are some of the issues that impacted 
egress and emergency response: 
 Outstanding interoperability among public agencies. However, private 
entities working for the event were not trained as well with the new radios 
and experienced communication problems during the incident. 
 There was no public address system or means of communicating with the 
thousands of runners and spectators. 
 Interlocking fences prevented the public form exiting the scene quickly. 
 Fencing also prevented quick access to victims by emergency responders. 
 Side streets were blocked by emergency vehicles trying to get to the scene, 
preventing safe egress of the spectators and runners. 
 First responders blocked their own access on side streets as they were trying 
to gain entry to the scene. 
 Streets and mass transportation were closed to prevent the suspects from 
escaping. The action also prevented people from leaving the downtown 
Boston area. 
 Buses should have remained on scene during the entire race, and shelters 
should have been open and available. 
4. Travis AFB Air Show  
Travis AFB is located in Fairfield, California and hosts an annual air show with 
both military and civilian aircraft performing demonstrations. The 2014 air show was billed 
as Thunder over Solano and more than 100,000 fans attended on May 4, the second day of 
the show.319 At approximately 2:00 pm, the pilot of a 1944 Stearman Biplane was 
performing an inverted maneuver to cut a ribbon with its tail.320 The pilot made three 
attempts to cut the ribbon, and all three had failed. The pilot made a fourth attempt and 
contacted the ground, sliding almost 800 feet down the runway. The aircraft remained on 
the runway a significant distance from the crowd (see Figure 14).321 The pilot was 
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uninjured initially but was upside down and unable to get out of his plane. He radioed for 
help as his plane caught fire. Unfortunately, he died because of the fire. Although the 
outcome of the incident was tragic, there was no injury to or involvement of the fans. This 
incident was unlike the Reno Air Race, in which the aircraft were flying directly at the 
crowd at high speeds.  
After the plane crashed, the air show announcer quickly and calmly spoke over the 
public address system informing the fans that an incident occurred, and they were safe. He 
also informed them that they must allow the fire department to do its job.322 Although fans’ 
first inclination was to go toward the incident, they remained calm and compliant behind 
the barriers. Although the fans were safe, the layout of the airshow and operations proved 
to be a problem for the air show, and this could have posed a safety hazard for the crowd.  
a. Crowd Structure 
Fans arrived at the Travis air show on May 4 and were directed to the parking area 
near the static aircraft display and concessions area. Like the day before, there were 
100,000 people attending the demonstration that day.323 In anticipation of warm weather, 
the website for the airshow advised people to bring chairs, strollers, nonalcoholic liquid, 
and sun protection.324 The crowd was able walk among the static displays of aircraft and 
along the taxiway. The public’s only boundary was marked by fence. No specific areas 
were designated for viewing or seating as is typical for many outdoor venues (see Figure 
14).  
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Figure 14.  Schematic of Air Show and Aerial Picture with Crash Site in 
Lower Right325 
                                                 
325 Source: Mark Loper Photography, email to author, June 29, 2017.  
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b. Causal Factors 
Planners at Travis AFB considered several factors for the safety of the air show. 
FAA and NTSB compliance, fire department response, footprint of the air show, and 
medical facilities were all part of planning for the venue to achieve complete public safety. 
Planners used NFPA Standard 101 for Life Safety, 403 for Airport Firefighting, and many 
other standards too numerous to list for general firefighting operations.326 Standards 101 
and 403 are part of hundreds of standards covering all aspects of firefighter equipment and 
general operations at any location. Standards 101 and 403 describe the responsibility for 
medical and life safety, while Standard 403 describes the required vehicles and equipment 
necessary to fight aircraft fires.327 Additionally, it details responsibility for fire/rescue 
equipment by indicating equipment should be stationed to have the shortest possible 
response distance and time to an incident.328 In the final planning briefing document, 
NTSB and FAA jointly stated that the Travis fire department administration accepted the 
submitted procedure before the air show.329 Morning briefings confirmed acceptance for 
all standards and directives by all agencies.330  
The planning operation involved conflicting information, which challenged 
Travis’s goal to maintain safety. Part of the planning document provided by administration 
at Travis AFB indicated that aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) vehicles would not 
allow a slowed response during an emergency.331 In the briefing, firefighters were told, 
“Emergency vehicles will be pre-positioned…as not to be trapped behind the crowd control 
lines.”332 However, the same document directed personnel to position aircraft and 
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emergency vehicles so they would not obstruct the view of the public. The NTSB observed 
and supported the U.S. Air Force instruction Conducting Air Force Open Houses, which 
states, “The safety of the spectators is of utmost importance.”333 The result was conflicting 
orders for fire department response to an emergency.  
During the emergency, ARFF 1 left the fire station and drove around the perimeter 
to get to the incident location rather than driving directly through the static display area. 
The decreased distance would have shortened the response time for firefighters to get to 
the burning aircraft. Fire station 1 was the primary emergency response vehicle for aircraft 
impact, and vehicles from station 3 and 4 would follow if needed.334 Station 1 was located 
behind the crowd line, which conflicted with instructions from administration. Both 
stations 3 and 4 were posted at shorter distances than station 1, and there was no crowd in 
front of them. However, their staging position also conflicted with administration orders 
for a quick response to an emergency.335 Additionally, the designated driving path for all 
vehicles from stations and staging was the along perimeter of the airshow, which would 
slow the response time.  
The contradictory orders and layout prompted commentary from a NTSB 
spokesperson, who said the configuration did not meet the requirement for crash fire rescue 
response.336 Travis administrators responded that the public was the priority, and crash 
incidents were secondary.337 If an incident would have occurred within the perimeter of 
the spectator area, a similar response would have slowed the arrival to victims since the 
fire department was only allowed to travel around the perimeter (see Figures 15 and 16). 
For the air show layout, see Figure 17.  
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The safety of fans was also inhibited by the availability of medical capability. There 
was one medical facility to serve an estimated 100,000 people at the air show located in an 
area stretching a mile in length.338 Figure 17 shows a red cross for the medical tent location; 
one ambulance and one doctor were stationed there. There were no easily identifiable 
safety people at the show. Furthermore, air show posters did not indicate the location and 
availability of medical personnel or how one might contact them in the event of an 
emergency.339  
 
Figure 15.  Crowd at Travis Air Show340 
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Figure 16.  Dense Crowd with Chairs and Strollers Held in with Interlocking 
Perimeter Fence341 
 
Figure 17.  Yellow Line is the Perimeter Fence Holding Crowd342  
                                                 
341 Source: Mark Loper Photography, email to author, June 29, 2017.  
342 Source: Mark Loper Photography, email to author, June 29, 2017.  
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c. Root Cause 
The study of the incident at Travis AFB did not include problems with crowd 
movement, although conflicting orders by planners would have created significant 
potential for patron injury if an incident occurred in the crowd. Therefore, the venue was 
unprepared and unsafe. ARFF 1 was unable to respond to the downed aircraft quickly due 
to the number of patrons blocking the station apparatus doors.343 Presumably, the same 
problem can have arisen in the event of an incident inside the static display and viewing 
area. NTSB reported planners at Travis AFB “stated” that during practice, before the air 
show, there were no patrons.344 Those conducting the practice did not consider what 
conditions would be like with the venue filled with people.345 The following are causes for 
conflicting information and unsafe practices: 
 Planning for the event should have included absolute acceptance of the 
orders and standards to prevent conflict. 
 Slowed response was not acceptable; however, ARFF was not allowed to 
drive in a direct route, which conflicted with FAA rules. 
 Because organizers at Travis AFB prohibited fire response from driving 
near the crowd, they ordered ARFF to drive around the show perimeter 
during emergencies. 
 There were no emergency driving lanes at the venue. 
 There was one medical facility staffed with one doctor. 
 One ambulance was staged near the medical facility. 
 Bike medics were not deployed and are commonly used in Sacramento 
D. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
There are many factors discussed in the four case studies that point to their 
respective root causes. Regardless of the differences in the type of venue, they share 
similarities that contributed (or may have contributed) to the outcome of the incidents. All 
events discussed in the case studies had large crowds at an outdoor event. The numbers of 
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individuals at the venues and their density created the potential for injury and the inability 
for emergency personnel to gain access. Of the planners in the four studies, only 
Hillsborough planners consulted the Green Guide to calculate the number of people 
allowable in the space provided, although they then completely disregarded the 
recommendation. Planners in the other studies did not appear to the use of the Green Guide 
or similar reference to determine the maximum number of people allowed for the venue 
space. In addition, ticket sales and patron registration were the only indicators that planners 
of the Hillsborough match could have used to determine crowd numbers; however, 
ticketless fans were allowed entry at the venue. Considering the size of crowds involved at 
the four venues, interoperability should have been a factor for all venues. However, 
emergency responders and volunteer staff at the Boston marathon were the only event in 
which responders and staff used up to date communications. Police specifically indicated 
radio problems at Hillsborough.  
Communications are routinely a problem at an any emergency scene and are 
compounded with different agencies working together. Communications in and among 
agencies at big events is a key issue; however, only the planners at the Boston Marathon 
considered them, which proved to be a boon for multiple agencies. Organizers of both the 
Reno Air Race and Boston Marathon planned and held drills to determine possible types 
of potential problems and how to prevent or mitigate them. They thought ahead by creating 
scenarios of the very calamities they later encountered. Additionally, these pre-event drills 
helped them to establish working relationships and build trust among different agencies. 
Reports on the Boston bombing specifically note the trust among agencies, which allowed 
them to work so well together. Also, notable in the Boston case study is the mutual aid 
among the eight cities involved in the race and their ability to work together. The planning 
agencies involved with the Reno case study also experienced the same working 
relationships during the race incident.  
Lastly, communication is one of the most important factors at any incident, and 
planner should consider communications in preparation for events. Of the four case studies, 
officials at Travis AFB were the only ones to use a public address system. While responders 
dealt with the crash, an announcer continually instructed the crowd to remain calm and 
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remain behind barriers for their safety; this service kept the crowd informed and safe. The 
same procedure could have been used at all other venues in the case studies, and had it 
been, it may have prevented injuries. The size of the venues was not an issue. Organizers 
could have used an address system with WIFI and blue tooth capability. For example, 
Boston planners could have easily provided an information system along the entire 26.2-
mile trek, which would have facilitated additional safety and security. 
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FIRE 
DEPARTMENT PLANNING 
The challenge with crowded venues is the inability of people to move and exit 
smoothly. The challenge increases during a perceived or actual emergency. It is important 
for fire departments to understand how crowds develop and move at outdoor events. Their 
primary responsibilities include prevention of harm through pre-planning at events and also 
care and transportation of the sick and injured. Predicting crowd behavior can prevent 
injury as people enter and exit venues.  
A. FINDINGS  
This research has identified common problems due to human behavior and their 
interaction with the environment that occur with crowds during emergencies. Fire 
departments use information from former events to prevent and mitigate problems during 
planning and response at incidents with large crowds. The result should decrease the 
response time to get fire, police, and EMS to the scene of an incident and increase life 
safety. The information is arranged in eight sections the follow: crowd behavior, variable 
crowd speed, density (how closely people stand together), immovable barriers become 
hazards, staged resources decrease response time, inability to communicate with a crowd 
creates problems, comprehensive planning/training, and unified command brings 
organization. 
1. Crowd Behavior at Outside Venues 
People can die of asphyxia if they fall in a dense crowd while it is moving. Moving 
like water in a stream, crowds may also be hampered by their ability to move freely due to 
obstacles such as people, sudden movement, turnstiles, or other barriers in their path. The 
incident at Hillsborough highlights this problem. During the Boston incident, there were 
problems with crowd movement because of interlocking fences that kept people on narrow 
sidewalks during an incident, interfering with their ability to find safe egress from a chaotic 
scene.  
 80
An unfortunate aspect of crowd behavior is the way it responds to stimuli. Noise, a 
real or perceived incident, or sudden movement can spark a reaction that can become 
dangerous. Announcers were aware of this possibility at the Travis AFB Air Show. An 
incident occurred when a plane crashed; however, the crowd was quickly calmed by the 
announcer, who gave them instructions for safety. He also announced updates during the 
mitigation of the incident over the public address system to ensure patrons safety. Fans at 
the Hillsborough soccer match did not experience the same calming effect when police 
were attempting to safely move the crowd into the stadium. The unfortunate response was 
crowd crush as the fans moved through an auxiliary gate that the police opened to relieve 
pressure on the inadequate turnstiles. The result was hundreds tripping, falling to the 
ground, and getting crushed by the crowd or being crushed against fences.  
2. Walking at Different Speeds Can Create Problems in a Crowd 
Individual groups form within crowds and travel at different speeds. Subgroups 
traveling at different speeds in a crowd can increase the possibility of individuals tripping 
or falling and sustaining an injury. Additionally, crowd make-up changes with the type of 
venue, and different type of patron attending the event. For example, sporting events like 
the Boston Marathon attract adults, children, and elderly, who all differ in size and walking 
speed. People using strollers, walkers, or wheel chairs walk slower. Motivated by 
attractions, food, and bathroom locations at the event, people also change direction and 
speeds when walking in crowds, which further affects the crowd. When people change 
their walking speed in a heavily populated venue, it can disrupt the forward progression of 
the crowd, much like what happens in a traffic jam. It then takes a few moments for the 
crowd to start up again and move in a forward generally direction. These problems emerged 
at the Hillsborough match as people continually changed direction as they tried to gain 
entry prior to the gate opening. Also, the air show at Travis AFB had very dense crowds, 
and people brought their own folding chairs and strollers. These are items that could create 
exiting problems and trip hazards in an emergency.  
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3. Density (How Closely People Stand Together) Affects Travel at an 
Event 
When people enter an event, they begin to form groups. As more people enter, the 
groups become larger. Depending on the venue, it is possible to have more than 100,000 
people at one event. The area where the crowd stands may be limited by fencing, which 
limits the number of people at the venue for safety. People individually move toward the 
area of entertainment, closing the distance between them and the person in front of them. 
Closing this gap increases the density of people in a given space. The incident at 
Hillsborough is a perfect example of what can happen when too many people try to occupy 
too small of a space. Crowds densities of five or less people per square meter allow patrons 
to walk and change direction without incident, while six or more people per square meter 
present certain danger should a person slip or fall.346 People become so close at six people 
per square meter that it causes them to bump into each or fall to the ground. The 1989 
incident at Hillsborough had densities of 12 or more people per square meter, causing 96 
deaths and more than 200 injuries during the crowd crush. Research into other case studies 
in this thesis did not indicate that crowd density was responsible for any injury.  
4. Immovable Barriers Become a Hazard 
Barriers to control crowds and traffic can become a safety hazard if not properly 
used and installed or easily movable. There were problems associated with the types of 
barriers at both the Boston and Reno events, and this led to egress problems. For example, 
in front of the bleachers, organizers at the Reno Air Race used fencing to construct 
preferred seating areas with multiple tables, chairs, and umbrellas for more than 1000 
patrons. The furniture then became obstacles. In the Boston event, installed and 
interlocking bicycle fencing prevented patrons from quickly escaping the area, which was 
compounded by the shutdown of public transportation to prevent the bombers from fleeing 
the area. In the process of trying to respond to the rescue area by side streets many fire, 
police, and EMS vehicles ended up blocking side streets, which also limited patrons’ ability 
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to exit the area. The action by the city, essentially held patrons, runners, and volunteers in 
a small area with no direction for egress.  
5. Staged Resources Decrease Response Time 
Staged resources can provide medical care while keeping egress routes open. Some 
fire, police, and EMS were staged at the Reno Air Race and Boston Marathon. Emergency 
responders understood that crowd density as well as traffic in and out of a venue would 
significantly increase response time in the event of an emergency. They placed vehicles 
and personnel at strategic locations, significantly decreasing response time to the incidents. 
Planning locations in advance also keeps human and vehicle traffic flowing at a venue as 
it did at some locations in Boston. In the Boston and Reno incidents, fire and EMS were 
credited by area trauma hospital physicians with saving lives. As a result of proper 
planning, patients were transported very quickly from the multicasualty incidents. 
Organizers at both venues recognized and understood the importance of readiness. The 
survivability of patients was increased by the fire and EMS response time.  
6. Inability to Communicate with the Crowd Can Be a Problem 
Communication is an inherent problem that has been noted at several of the case 
studies in this thesis. For example, police at the Hillsborough match specifically noted they 
were unable to understand orders over their radios. Organizers of the Boston Marathon 
used a state of the art communication system that worked very well between agencies. They 
set up an entire network along the 26.2-mile course to provide continual information to and 
interoperability between agencies. Unfortunately, as at the Hillsborough match, the owners 
of the stadium or the police did not have a communication system capable of updating and 
addressing the crowd, which left people uninformed about emergency plans and exits. The 
incident Travis AFB reveals several communication issues between command and 
vehicles; however, the public address system provided continual information to the crowd. 
Announcers updated the crowd during the incident, thus keeping people safe, informed, 
and prevented chaos while emergency vehicles arrived. 
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7. Comprehensive Planning and Training Can Improve Event Response 
The case studies revealed that organizers at Hillsborough and Travis AFB did not 
consider two crucial factors, comprehensive planning and training prior to the events. 
Organizers in Reno and Boston developed plans that included all emergency responders, 
as well as all interested stakeholders in the cities. The office of emergency service, 
emergency planners, hospital coordinators, dispatch supervisors, city council members, 
Department of Transportation, parking, and many other agencies took part in all planning 
for the events. Organizers at the events in Boston and Reno clearly stated at planning 
meetings that no one should be meeting another official for the first time at the scene of an 
emergency.347 Additionally, the organizers recognized it was imperative that everyone 
involved knew and worked with everyone else. In addition to planning at the local and state 
levels, organizers of both the marathon and air race held drills. Reno used actors with 
makeup simulating wounds and injuries so that participants would become familiar with 
all aspects of an emergency. The mock patients were put in treatment and triage areas and 
then transported to hospitals to make the drill as realistic as possible. Area hospitals 
credited the simulations for saving the lives of people in Reno. Boston used table top 
scenarios and was later given praise by Governor Patrick, who recognized the speed of care 
and organization that would not have been possible without previous training and the trust 
developed by working together.348 
Planning and training breeds familiarity, knowledge, and trust among everyone 
working at an emergency scene. As Archilochos astutely noted, “We don’t rise to the level 
of our expectations, we fall to the level of our training.”349 Officials in both Boston and 
Reno understood also that the associations made during planning and training would 
become a force multiplier for future venues or incidents. The knowledge obtained in 
training could be carried and taught to others by emergency responders and public officials. 
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8. Unified Command Brings Organization 
Unified command is part of planning and the incident command system. 350 It 
should be used when more than one agency is at an emergency or planned event for an 
extended time period.351 In the case studies personnel in only two events, the Reno Air 
Race and the Boston Marathon, used a unified command system.352 Planners of both events 
recognized the need for the organization that unified command brings to an event. Boston 
Marathon’s unified command center was located at the Westin Hotel, near the scene of the 
bombing. In addition to fire, law, and EMS, the mayor, and governor were located at the 
command post.353 While public safety was taking care of the scene, the mayor and 
governor assisted by declaring a state of emergency and calling on additional emergency 
responder assets to assist in mitigation of the scene.354 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section contains recommendations, based on data on crowd behavior and the 
case studies, particularly common problems, to assist fire departments with pre-event 
planning to decrease the possibility of injury at crowded outside events. They have been 
divided into eight sections and arranged from the beginning of an outdoor event to the 
opening day. Each section has information supporting other recommendations provided. 
The sections are: stakeholders, planning, training, staffing, communication, overcrowding, 
supportive measures, and education.  
1. Establish Relationships among Stakeholders before Events  
Stakeholders are tremendously important to the success of an event at an outdoor 
venue. They make decisions and offer approval for public agencies to provide the required 
services needed to protect the public at events. Depending on the type of event, they may 
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include officials from local, state, and federal agencies, as well all related agencies in the 
proposed venue. The governor, mayor, city council, county supervisors, Office of 
Emergency Services, fire, police, EMS, Department of Transportation, Department of 
Health, local emergency medical authority, hospitals, parking, and sanitation are all 
stakeholders to consider for planning. Boston fire, police, and EMS understood the need 
for buy-in from stakeholders in planning for the marathon. Organizers for the Reno Air 
Race also understood the need for bringing stakeholders together; however, they focused 
mainly on emergency response and delivery. Boston planners were thinking ahead when 
they brought together all the interested parties to the table to discuss public safety for the 
pending marathon. They also recognized the importance of working together and that the 
only way to have a successful venue was to establish working relationships between and 
among each other.355 Trust is established by working together and allows for faster 
decisions at emergency incidents. The Boston agencies working together knew the saying, 
“You don’t want to be exchanging business cards at the scene of a disaster,” and they were 
dedicated to working and knowing each other during the entire process of the marathon.356  
2. Planning is Essential 
Planning for an event is an essential part of any venue and should be conducted by 
appropriate emergency services and other stakeholders. Both Reno and Boston conducted 
comprehensive planning and working exercises that provided outstanding dividends. Their 
efforts were realized by the professional and expedient care of the wound after each event 
experienced deadly incidents. In contrast, stakeholders Hillsborough and Travis were not 
involved with planning or nor did they hold a detailed exercise prior to their events. The 
case studies in this theses prove that planning has produced positive results.  
Planning meetings held in preparation for upcoming events allow fire departments 
and other agencies to work together. The planning organization may be only a few 
individuals for small venues or very large like Boston where hundreds attended. Meetings, 
like Boston’s planning meeting, are too large to manage and operate as one group, 
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exceeding the span of control. Therefore, it is important to establish operating break-out 
groups to develop strategies for managing and organizing situations that need attention. An 
executive group should coordinate information among city officials, who are responsible 
for budgeting funds to support the venue and developing funding streams that may recoup 
expenses for the venue. A safety group consisting of fire, police, and EMS should organize 
safety and protection. A logistics group brings parking, sanitation, and fencing together 
and should work closely with the safety group to ensure proper exiting of the event. 
3. Training is the Foundation for Safe Operations 
Training is closely related to planning since it uses the information developed from 
planning to understand the needs and the people attending the venue. Training can then be 
specifically tailored to prevent and mitigate anticipated incidents and threats. The incidents 
discussed in Chapter II did not reveal any information about training prior to their events. 
A panel on the Hillsborough match produced a detailed report and findings for the outcome 
of the incident; however, in it, here was no indication of any training or organization before 
the soccer match. Organizers for the air show at Travis AFB also did not provide training 
involving stakeholders prior to the air show. In contrast, organizers at both Reno and 
Boston understood the possibility of an incident, and they established working scenarios 
for multiple possibilities at the venues.357 These scenarios were initially performed as table 
top exercises.358 Use of a tabletop exercise allows the introduction of new questions and 
possibilities to incident mitigation, which can then be injected into training scenarios. 
Additionally, tabletop exercises also allow stakeholders to understand the scope of an 
incident and the requirements necessary for emergency scene mitigation. After table top 
exercises, the next step is to perform a realistic live scenario. All agencies related to scene 
response and mitigation should be involved just as they were in the live exercise held in 
Reno. In the Reno exercise, 50 agencies participated. During the Boston exercises, 600 
agencies participated.359 In both the Reno scenario, actors mimicked an aircraft disaster 
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and the problems associated with care and transportation of the resulting patients. There 
were no shortcuts; the scenario operated as real disaster. Organizers used findings at the 
end of the scenario were to set up emergency services at the Reno Air Race. The training 
at Reno proved to be a benefit by the expedient way the incident was mitigated. 
4. Interoperability is Also About Communication 
Communication is a common problem at venues and incidents. The problems 
established with communications at the venues this thesis discusses could have been 
prevented by providing proper training for all workers with radios and setting up a public 
address system to help inform the public and participants. Location, noise from the crowd, 
and capability of radios are all factors that can contribute to radio failure when responders 
are establishing safety for the public. The independent report for the incident at 
Hillsborough soccer match specifically indicated there were communication problems 
between police officers in the command center, on horseback, and on foot.360 The results 
of communication problems can prevent proper decision making may affect the 
survivability of any or all the injured individuals at a venue or incident. Members of the 
grunge band Pearl Jam attempted to use a public address system at a Dutch concert to stop 
crowd crush by asking the people in the crowd to each take three steps back, slowing their 
forward progression.361 Announcers at Travis AFB successfully used a public address 
system to inform the patrons of the crash and keep them calm during the incident at the air 
show.362 
Planners for Boston Marathon specifically addressed the probability of 
communication problems along the 26.2-mile route and through eight different cities while 
using different types of radios. Planners attempted to prevent communication problems by 
obtaining grants to purchase an interoperable radio system allowing communication across 
all bands of the radio seamlessly.363 The system worked very well with emergency 
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agencies. However, some volunteers were unfamiliar with the use of the radios and 
consequently were unable to receive updated information as it became available.364 
Mistakenly, the radios were not programmed to work with public service bands.365 This 
prevented workers from updating and directing runners at the race. The planning for the 
marathon did not include a public address system downtown or along the route to update 
fans or athletes, which meant they arrived at a chaotic scene with no direction for safety.  
5. Volunteer Staffing is an Essential Part of Planning 
Volunteers can be a significant asset for fire departments and for the communities 
they serve and not just in emergencies. They should be included at public events to increase 
safety for the patrons attending. They are trained for several disciplines that aid during 
planned events and emergencies; CERT members are an asset for fire and police 
departments. Additionally, CERT provides support by assisting at medical tents, triage, 
crowd management, communications, and transportation, and fire departments should take 
CERT services into consideration in planning for events at crowded venues. Volunteers 
can also staff shelters and drive buses at large venues. Planners in Boston were thinking 
ahead when they considered the number of runners and volunteers at the race. City officials 
secured multiple shelters and provided buses to transport athletes to shelters in the likely 
possibility of an incident.366 However, information after the event revealed the shelters 
were not staffed, and the buses were sent away, since it was determined they would not be 
needed. The buses and shelters could have been used for the 5,000 runners that had not yet 
arrived at the scene of the incident, keeping them from adding to the already chaotic scene. 
6. Overcrowding Can Be Prevented with Proper Planning 
Overcrowding at outdoor venues is an ongoing problem regardless of death and 
injuries at past events. As recently as July 2017, a crowd of thousands assembled to watch 
a soccer match in Turin, Italy. When a prankster lit some fireworks, the crowd believed the 
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noise was gunshots and the resulting crowd crush injured 1,500 people.367 Organized use 
of fire department inspections, Green Guide recommendations, fitting the venue, ticket 
sales, and registration are all means of preventing overcrowding.  
Specifically, the panel on the Hillsborough incident reported that the fire 
department performed inspections on the stadium and owners adhered to adherence to fire 
ordinances. The panel’s report also cited many infractions that should have limited the use 
of the facility; however, owners and the police department disregarded the report.368 
Organizers of the Hillsborough match consulted but did not use the standards in the Green 
Guide, an internationally recognized publication to determines capacity at venues. The 
information would have helped to make sure that the crowd size fit the venue. In other 
words, the calculation in the Green Guide would have shown organizers the proper size of 
crowd for the capacity of the stadium. In addition to ordinance and calculations for 
maximum capacity, two other methods can be applied to keep the crowd to regulated size. 
First, ticket sales determine the number of individuals allowed at an event. Second is by 
the use of online registration, which can be halted when the maximum number of 
participants have been reached. The registered patrons would print a ticket that could be 
collected at the venue. The independent report of the Hillsborough incident in 1989 
reported ticketless fans contributed to crowd size, but no one prevented them from gaining 
entry.369 Holding tickets is an absolute means for police to determine the number of fans 
allowed at a venue.  
Other problems arise from events that are free like the Love Parade, where an 
estimated 1,000,000 music fans arrived in one day. For instance, it is impossible to control 
the number of fans arriving at a free venue unless registration or tickets sales are provided 
and managed at the gates. However, one method to monitor and prevent overcrowding is 
to mandate online registration by fans. They would have to bring the printed registration 
                                                 
367 Reynolds, “Turin Stampede.”  
368 Hillsborough Independent Panel, Hillsborough, 66.  
369 Ibid., 10.  
 90
number to gain entry. This would also require security at the gate to prevent unregistered 
individuals from entering.  
7. Supportive Measures to Decrease Crowd Density 
This section suggests recommendations that do not fit in any particular category 
but are nonetheless important. Related to the recommendation to “fit the venue,” another 
possibility is for event organizers to merely change the size of the grounds and find another 
location that to accommodate the anticipated crowd. Jumbotrons or large TV monitors 
should be placed in areas to allow the crowd to move to less densely populated areas of the 
venue. This practice is common at some sporting events and concerts to give patrons 
optimal viewing. Another means of preventing crowds from all moving to one location is 
to provide a theater in the round, moving stages, and multiple stages located at opposite 
sides of the venue. These are strategies that help spread out the people and prevent dense 
crowds. There are also some methods that can be used to slow the traffic as people enter, 
thus spreading the crowd out to prevent bunching up and possible injury. 
As part of the planning phase of any venue, there are some strategies to help manage 
the patrons as they enter and locate seating at an event. A will call booth should be set-up 
away from the main entrance for last minute tickets or registration. Multiple entrances 
should be available to prevent a bottlenecks and slow patron entry as at the Hillsborough 
soccer match. Security should check tickets away from the entrances to facilitate movement 
of the fans into the venue. Events that do not provide seating should have clearly marked 
areas where folding chairs or blankets can be used. Water filled jersey barriers can mark 
isles for entrance and egress of a given area; however, planners need to be cognizant of 
crowd capacity in these areas. Lastly, emergency vehicle lanes should be provided on all 
main streets to decrease emergency response time and increase safety.  
8. Educating People Will Make Them Safe 
Education is certainly not the least important recommendation for safety and crowd 
control. As previously stated, all the recommendations work together to provide optimum 
safety and crowd density reduction. The following strategies are related to steps that people 
already observe; they may not often think about the education they are receiving to make 
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them safe. For example, the first item anyone receives after purchasing a ticket at theme 
park is a pamphlet that includes the times for attractions. More importantly, a map explains 
where every attraction is located, bathrooms, food, exits, and emergency phone numbers 
in case of an incident. Airlines offer fliers safety information with their three-minute 
informational speech about safety. Schools routinely teach children about fire safety and 
conduct regular fire drills. Many businesses also practice safety training to ensure the safety 
of their employees. This thesis recommends that organizers of large events provide the 
same type of informational pamphlets to people as they enter a venue. The information 
should also be provided on social media prior to the opening of the event and updates sent 
through interactive app on attendees’ phones. At large outdoor events, announcements 
should be made periodically at the venue over public address system and social media to 
remind patrons about the importance of safety and the locations where patrons can find 
care or assistance. In addition, venues should feature large, easily seen exit signs and exit 
arrows, which can be painted on the ground, grass, or pavement, just as large stores do. 
These educational methods would allow people to become accustomed to safety 
instructions just as they have learned from fire drills and airplanes. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has explored how crowds respond during an incident that may result in 
their injury or death. It could be a sudden weather change, noise interpreted as a gunshot, 
movement in a crowd or other man-made event. Crowd reaction in an emergency is not 
necessarily a flight response as described by Fahy, Proulx, and Aiman. They indicate that 
crowds do not truly panic but make decisions based on their information for exiting.370 
Crowd reaction at the Reno Air Race proved that people do not run maniacally in any 
direction seeking safety, instead they can move methodically to exits from the bleachers. 
Helbing and Johansson also support the theory that people can make judgments in an 
emergency.371 However, researchers in the science of crowd dynamics and safety are not 
all on the same page. Some are opposed to any theory other than their own, like Yanagisawa 
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et al. who advocated barrier use.372 However, all the case studies in this research include 
problems related to barriers during the incidents. Other researchers are not in favor of 
installing barriers.  
Researchers also continue to try and explain the phenomenon of crowd crush and 
have developed software mimicking human movement and reaction while attempting to 
evacuate buildings, aircraft, and stadia through turnstiles in emergent situations.373 It 
appears that there is more research on how injuries to humans happen rather than how to 
prevent them from happening. Fruin’s research that advocates what would seem obvious; 
keep crowd size manageable and crowd densities to a minimum.374 
It is difficult to find information about crowd dynamics related to fire department 
planning and safety information. Therefore, fire departments should work with law 
enforcement to apply information on crowd dynamics to fire department operations. It is 
important for fire departments to follow-up with organizers of events and follow current 
ordinance for public safety and determine the available space at venues. The space 
available determines the number of people that can be placed in the given area.375 The 
crowds are going to continue to gather at favorite events.376 It is the responsibility of public 
agencies to monitor and assist organizers in developing safe venues to prevent injury to the 
patrons.  
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